August 2, 2012

Equities: Is a bear market inevitable in this economy?

Posted in debt, Economic Growth, Economy, Europe, Finance, government, investment banking, investments, payroll tax reductions, recession, Stocks, Uncategorized, Unemployment tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 7:40 PM by Robert Barone

All of the data and the trends in the data indicate that it is possible that a recession might already have begun.

• Job creation has been dismal in the second quarter, with little hope for improvement soon; jobless claims are, once again, on the rise.

• Retail sales have fallen three months in a row; this has never occurred without an ensuing recession. What is of greater concern is that this has occurred while gasoline prices have been falling.

• While market pundits have cheered small gains in housing data, it is clear that housing is still bottom bouncing. Changes in foreclosure laws have caused supply constraints that have made it appear that home prices are rising again.

• Industrial production, the one bright spot in the economy, showed a decline in May before recovering somewhat in June.

• The drought has caused raw food and commodity prices to spike. These will soon translate into higher food and raw input costs. (Is anyone now questioning the wisdom of the congressional mandate to produce increasing quantities of ethanol from corn instead of sugar?)

 • Consumer confidence continues at levels below those seen in past recessions . Much of this is due to uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy and taxes.

• In the June Philadelphia Fed Survey, manufacturers were asked to list reasons for slowing production; 52 percent cited uncertain tax policy and government regulations.

• Real incomes are falling. The downward bias in the inflation numbers produced by the government inflates the reported GDP numbers. It has been my view that, as a result of the biased reporting, the recession never really ended, and real GDP is much lower than reported.

 Equity market up for year

 Nevertheless, despite all of the poor data, the equity markets have held up. At 1,338 (the closing level on July 25), the S&P 500 is still 6.4 percent higher than it was at the beginning of the year. This is strange, given that every other major market in the world is down 20 percent and in bear market territory. Here are a couple of possible explanations:

• The equity markets used to be a leading indicator of the economy. Severe market corrections (20 percent or more) usually meant recession was either imminent or already here. But, with the advent of computerized trading, the market now appears to be more of a coincident indicator. In late 2007, when the last recession began, the market was only off 5 percent from its October peak.

• Europe: There is such financial chaos in Europe that a flight to the dollar is continuing. Because higher quality bond yields are so low, some of the funds have found their way into the U.S. equity markets, thus keeping them buoyed.

Neither of these two reasons should give investors any confidence that U.S. markets can hold up. Besides the poor internal economic data within the U.S., worldwide data have been weak. In addition to the obvious problems in Europe, China is in a much slower growth mode, as is Japan, the rest of Asia, and even the commodity producers like Australia and Canada.

European soap opera
 
Europe is a whole other issue. American markets have benefited from their financial issues, but when panic and contagion show up over there, markets behave poorly over here. We have seen this time and again as the European drama (really a soap opera) has unfolded. It would be far better for the European politicians to come up with an
orderly plan for countries to exit the monetary union than to deny that the union isn’t in any danger of falling apart.

 

Solvable “fiscal cliff”

Finally, the approaching “fiscal cliff” in the U.S. is another wild card that could have a significant impact on capital markets. The good thing about the “fiscal cliff” is that it isn’t an outside force being imposed. The cliff is avoidable and completely under the control of Congress and the president.

With all of this going on, is a bear market inevitable? While I think that the confluence of events (worldwide economic slowdown, slowdown in the U.S., European financial chaos, “fiscal cliff”) make it likely, as I indicated in my last column, the application of “business friendly” policies could prevent it.

Until visibility into policy becomes clearer, investors should continue to be extremely cautious. They should remain liquid.

 Finally, the U.S. economy is so fragile that any external shock, like a financial implosion in Europe, is certain to have negative impacts on U.S. markets. Policy responses to economic slowdown or financial chaos (e.g., printing of money by the European Central Bank or QE3 by the Fed) are likely to have a positive impact on the value of precious metals and commodities. And the ongoing drought will definitely move food and commodity prices upward.

Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value
Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, a Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.
 
Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.
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July 27, 2012

New Soap Opera: The Comedy of Euros

Posted in Banking, Bankruptcy, Economy, Europe, Finance, greece, Spain tagged , , , , , , , , , , , at 8:49 PM by Robert Barone

The term “European Theater” was first coined during World War II. Today in the financial markets, the term has come to symbolize an ongoing soap opera, where the audience is continually held in suspense as the bad actors (the politicians) promise actions and solutions to current crises, which have been created by their prior actions. Each time solutions are proposed, the audience breathes a sigh of relief (i.e., relief rally in the equity markets) only to be disappointed when they find out that the solutions won’t work or can’t be implemented.
 
As a result, the crisis and suspense continues, keeping the audience’s total attention (even while dinner on the stove at home is burning). Meanwhile, a new issue or crisis appears, it seems, on a daily basis.
 

Likely New Episodes

Daily we watch yields on Spanish and Italian debt move ever higher, now in zones where other countries have cried “uncle” and asked for bailout help. At the same time, the credit default swaps on Spanish and Italian debt have risen to record levels.
 
New Episode: Will the capital markets force a Spanish bailout by locking Spain out of the debt markets?
 
  • Spanish bank recapitalization: We have recently learned that the European Central Bank is willing to impose losses on the shareholders and junior bondholders of some of the Spanish savings banks. (When they bailed out Ireland, all bondholders were saved.) The draft of the document meant to give Spain’s banks 100 billion euros has this provision, but the periphery’s finance ministers are opposing it.
 
  • New Episode: Is 100 billion euros enough for Spain’s banks? The general rule of thumb appears to be that the ultimate amount needed is usually higher by a factor of at least two.
 
  • Spain’s regional provinces are now coming hat in hand for bailouts of their own. And those regional governments must refinance more than 35 billion euros in the near future.
 
  • New Episode: Are there enough resources in the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the temporary bailout fund, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the proposed permanent bailout fund, to bail out Spain and its regions? What about Italy?
 
  • The problematic link between Spain’s sovereign and its bank’s balance sheets has not been severed, as the audience was led to believe during the “Summit” episode.
 
  • New Episode: Will the ESM require the Spanish government to guarantee the bank capital? If so, will market reaction drive borrowing rates for Spain even higher, or lock them out of the capital markets altogether?
 
  • Greece now appears unable to produce an austerity plan acceptable to the Troika (EU Commission, ECB and International Monetary Fund). Greece has a 3.8 billion euro bond payment due in August. And the ECB just announced that it will no longer accept Greek government bonds as collateral for loans, thus locking Greece out of ECB borrowing.
 
  • New Episode: Will the Troika impose its own plan, or will it withhold bailout funding? Without access to the ECB, will Greece default again? And, will this lead to Greece’s immediate and disorderly exit from the monetary union?
  • Each monetary union country is required to put capital into the ESM. Italy will be required to pony up 20% of the ESM capital.
 
  • New Episode: What sense does it make for Italy to borrow at 7% when the ESM would offer a rate of return that is closer to 3%?
 
  • The ECB holds tons of Greek debt on their balance sheet at par (i.e., 100% of face value) (Portuguese, Spanish and Italian debt, too). If (when) Greece leaves the monetary union, they will renounce this debt, causing the ECB to need more capital to cover this loss.
 
  • New Episode: Will the remaining members be able to contribute even more capital? That will put additional pressure on the weaklings — again, Portugal, Spain and Italy will have to go to the capital markets to borrow at extremely high rates to meet their capital contribution requirements.
 
  • Will the ESM be allowed to purchase sovereign debt in the secondary market as promised in the “Summit” episode? This is meant to support Spain and lower the interest rate it has to pay to borrow. The Dutch, Finns and probably the Germans may say ‘Nein.’

Politicians in a Box

The bad actors in this soap opera, the politicians, know that if they attempt to do the right thing, they will be voted out of office by populations who value their entitlements more than anything else. Look at Greece and the near victory by the Syriza party (anti-austerity) in the last set of elections. And now, we see riots in Spain.
 
These bad actors have proposed so-called “fixes” that merely kick the can down the road, from bailouts (Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland) to a banking union in order to avoid addressing the core issues. The fixes enacted calm the audience for shorter and shorter periods. For example, the deposit flight from Spain’s banks now continues unabated, despite the capital plan for Spanish banks announced during the recent “Summit”.
 
This soap opera will continue to play out because liquidity does not produce solvency. The ECB and politicians can throw all of the money they can create at the problem, but, until debt restructuring occurs (i.e., dealing with the debt), the soap opera will continue. Debt restructuring means that some lenders won’t get repaid at all and others will have to take a haircut. Inevitably, some financial institutions (i.e., lenders) will fail. The game to keep them alive cannot go on forever.
 
Eventually, the markets will tire of the soap opera, lose confidence (as they appear to be doing), and close the capital market to these players. It would be much better to have an orderly restructuring than a disorderly one imposed by a panicky market. But, so far, no European leader has stepped up with such a plan (i.e., a plan to exit the weaklings from the monetary union).
 
Without such a plan, the stronger European nations (like Germany, Finland and The Netherlands) will soon have had enough and will leave the monetary union on their own, most likely, to go back to their old currencies.
 

The Final Episode?

It appears that many of the New Episodes described above will soon play out as the situation appears to be in endgame mode. Some sort of resolution acceptable to the capital markets is being demanded by those very markets. The roller coaster is at full speed and it appears the tracks are about to end.
 
What new games can the European politicians play to buy more time? Is there anything they can do, short of having a plan to exit the southern weaklings that can now save the euro? What can they do now to even buy more time?
 
Unfortunately, it appears that a market-imposed resolution, which means market panic and financial chaos for Europe with grave worldwide implications, is rapidly approaching.
 
 
Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value
Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, a Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.
 
Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.

July 23, 2012

Time for us to make enlightened policies

Posted in Armageddon, Bankruptcy, debt, Economic Growth, Economy, Europe, Finance, Foreign, recession, Spain, Uncategorized, Unemployment tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 8:10 PM by Robert Barone

On July 6, the country received another disappointing jobs report. For the month, the establishment survey indicated jobs grew by 80,000; for the quarter, such growth averaged 75,000, about one-third of the 26,000 monthly average for the first quarter. Clearly, the worldwide slowdown in Europe, China, India, Brazil, etc. is having an impact here.
 
Deleveraging and slow growth
 
Let’s be clear. We are in the midst of a worldwide debt deleveraging (i.e., consumers are paying down debt instead of consuming). So, absent another round of sweeping innovation anytime soon (e.g. the Internet), in the natural course of things, economic growth is going to be painfully hard to come by. As a result, it is doubly important that economic policies promote the growth that is available.
 
Policies are key
 
Clearly, monetary policy has led with pedal-to-the-metal and unconventional therapies. On the fiscal side, the Keynesian remedies (huge deficits) have been applied. Together, however, such policies haven’t worked well enough to establish a solid economic foundation, as the recent data prove. For those who study economic history, it is clear that deficit spending alone doesn’t work if government is simply stepping into the role of debtor in place of households, as total debt owed has continued to rise.The scary part is the interest cost of the rapidly accumulating debt when interest rates rise. For those who don’t believe me, just look at Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus and Italy in today’s world. Rising interest rates (near 7 percent for the 10-year government issue) make it impossible for states to survive without bankruptcy, a bailout or financial ruin.

 
Policy failures
 
In times like today, when deleveraging is slowing economic activity, government should adopt policies that promote the private sector, because it is the private sector, not government, that is the engine of economic growth. Unfortunately, the following federal policies currently are negatively impacting the private sector:

• Taxes:
Uncertainty surrounding tax policy causes the private sector to take less risk, which lowers investment and job creation. For the last several years, Congress has signaled that significant tax increases are just ahead (currently referred to as the “fiscal cliff” due to occur on Jan. 1, 2013), only to push them back at the last minute for another short period. Nevertheless, the uncertainty persists, and economic hesitancy pervades.
 
• Corporate cash: America’s multinational corporations are flush with cash, and while the politicians chide them for not putting it to work at home, it is their very policies that are to blame. Sixty percent of that corporate stash is held offshore, and it won’t come home because, if it does, 35 percent of it will disappear in taxation. Policies that encourage the return of that cash and its investment at home would spur job creation and economic growth.

• Corporate tax rate:
Having one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world discourages investment at home and makes investment elsewhere more fruitful. Corporate taxes are paid by consumers via higher prices.

• Energy policy: 
Cheap energy is the No. 1 requirement for robust economic growth. Current policies appear to be designed to raise energy prices to spur the development of government selected industries. The result is great waste (e.g. Solyndra) and significantly reduced economic growth.

• Taxmageddon:
The U.S. has a joke for a tax code. Talk about a Rube Goldberg! High, and threatened increased taxes on capital and investment just discourage economic growth. The tax code needs to be thrown out in favor of a broad-based, simple, and fair system.

• The financial system:
Scandal after scandal show how pervasive lawlessness is among the world’s “too big to fail” institutions. So far, no U.S. banker has gone to jail, nor trial, nor has anyone been indicted. Regulatory policy encourages moral hazard (excessive risk taking backed by implicit taxpayer bailouts) and discourages lending to the private sector. All of this reduces economic growth.
 
 

Investing in a deleveraging world 

 
For investors, the markets will continue to show volatility, with market up-drafts occurring when there is a perception of a policy change. For example, the recent hope generated by the late June “European Summit” caused a large rally in the equity markets, as will the hoped for move by the Fed toward more stimulus when and if it occurs. Down-drafts occur when poor economic data cross the tape.
 
Implications for Nevada
 
The policy prescription doesn’t end at the federal level. It is also relevant at the state and even local levels. Nevada has been challenged to attract new businesses now that gaming is widespread.The tax system in Nevada could be such a strength, especially when compared to what is going on in California. CNBC ranks Nevada 18 in “Business Friendliness,” but 30 in “Cost of Business.” Two things are critical: 1) The Legislature must stop threatening new business taxation every two years when it meets. The uncertainty this breeds prevents businesses from relocating here.

2) Policymakers must identify those businesses that would benefit from such a philosophy. There might be several categories that would so benefit, but one immediately comes to mind (maybe because I have worked in it all my life) — financial and intangible asset firms. This category includes managers of investments, hedge funds, trusts, patents and trademarks, insurance companies and services, banking and subsidiary finance companies. While these firms are usually small, their salary levels generally are high. A University of Nevada, Reno study indicates that salaries in these firms average $88,000, twice the state’s average.

Jon Ralston, a political columnist and host of a daily political commentary show seen locally, recently criticized the Apple move, saying that they will grow “astronomical profits” but that the state won’t benefit much because the number of jobs is small. But its move, along with those of Microsoft (which now employs several hundred), Intuit (also a large employer), Oracle and others, appears to recognize that Nevada, indeed, has something to offer now. If the state attracts enough of these companies, there will be plenty of tax revenue generated. The state should play to its current strengths and make sure its policies protect and nurture those strengths.

 
 
Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value
Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, a Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.
 
Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521.
Ph: (775) 284-7778.
 

July 9, 2012

Economic issues, good and bad

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, debt, Economic Growth, Economy, Europe, Federal Reserve, Finance, government, greece, Housing Market, International Swaps and Derivatives, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, Italy, recession, sovereign debt, Spain, taxes, Unemployment tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 3:17 PM by Robert Barone

This is a mid-year overview of the economic and policy issues in the U.S. and worldwide, both positive and negative. I have divided the issues into economic and policy issues. With enough political will, policy issues can be addressed in the short run, while economic issues are longer-term in nature and are clearly influenced by policy.

Positives

• Cheap energy (economics and policy): There is growing recognition that cheap energy is key to economic growth; the next boom will be based on cheap energy.
 
• Manufacturing (economics): After years of decline, American manufacturing is in a renaissance, led by the auto industry.

• Corporate health (economics): Large corporations are extremely healthy with large cash hoards and many have low cost and low levels of debt.

• Politics (policy): Americans are tired of special interests’ ability to pay for political favors.

 
Negatives
 
• Recession in Europe (economics): This has implications for world growth because Europe’s troubled banks are the engines of international lending; Europe’s economy rivals that of the U.S. in size.

• European Monetary Union (policy): A Greek exit from the euro is still probable after recent election and is likely to spread contagion to Portugal, Spain and even Italy. There is also danger here to America’s financial system.

• Brazil, Russia, India, China or the BRIC, Growth Rate (economics): China appears to be in danger of a hard landing, as is Brazil. India is already there. This has serious implications for commodity producers like Canada and Australia.

• Fiscal cliff and policy uncertainties (policy): A significant shock will occur to the U.S. economy if tax policy (Bush tax cut expiration and reinstatement of the 2 percent payroll tax) isn’t changed by Jan. 1, 2013.

• Entitlements (policy): Mediterranean Europe is being crushed under the burden of entitlements; the U.S. is not far behind. This is the most serious of the fiscal issues but the hardest for the political system to deal with.

• Housing (economic & policy): In the U.S., housing appears to have found a bottom, but because of falling prices and underwater homeowners, a significant recovery is still years away. Housing is a huge issue in Europe, especially Spain, and it will emerge as an issue in Australia and Canada if China has a hard landing.

• Energy costs (economics & policy): The current high cost of energy is killing worldwide growth (see “Positives” above).

• U.S. taxmageddon (policy): The U.S. tax system discourages savings and investment (needed for growth), encourages debt and favors specific groups.

• Too Big To Fail (TBTF) (policy): The U.S. financial system is dominated by TBTF institutions that use implicit government backing to take unwarranted risk; TBTF has now been institutionalized by the Dodd-Frank legislation; small institutions that lend to small businesses are overregulated and are disappearing.

• Debt overhang (economics): The federal government, some states and localities and many consumers have too much debt; the de-leveraging that must occur stunts economic growth.

• Inflation (economics & policy): Real inflation is much higher than officially reported. If a true inflation index were used, it is likely that the data would show that the recession still hasn’t ended.

It is clear from the points above and from the latest data reports that worldwide, most major economies are slowing. It is unusual to have them all slowing at the same time and thus, the odds of a worldwide recession are quite high.

In the context of such an event or events, the U.S. will likely fare better than most. But that doesn’t mean good times, just better than its peers. There is also greater potential of destabilizing events (oil and Iran, contagion from Europe, Middle East unrest), which may have negative economic impacts worldwide. Thus, in the short-term it appears that the U.S. economy will continue its lackluster performance with a significant probability of an official recession and vulnerable to shock type events. (Both the fixed income and the equity markets seem to be signaling this.)

 
 
The extension of Operation Twist by the Federal Reserve on June 20 (the Fed will swap $267 billion of short-term Treasury notes for long-term ones through Dec. 31 which holds long-term rates down) was expected, and continues the low interest rate policy that has been in place for the past four years. That means interest rates will continue to remain low for several more years no matter who is elected in November. Robust economic growth will only return when policies regarding the issues outlined in the table are addressed.

Looking back at my blogs over the years, I have always been early in identifying trends. The positive trends are compelling despite the fact that the country must deal with huge short-term issues that will, no doubt, cause economic dislocation.

The only question is when the positives will become dominant economic forces, and that is clearly dependent on when enabling policies are adopted. 1) In the political arena, there is a growing restlessness by America’s taxpayers over Too Big To Fail and political practices where money and lobbyists influence policy and law (e.g., the Taxmageddon code). 2) The large cap corporate sector is healthier now than at any time in modern history. Resources for economic growth and expansion are readily available. Only a catalyst is needed. 3) America is on the “comeback” trail in manufacturing. Over the last decade, Asia’s wages have caught up.

Cultural differences and expensive shipping costs are making it more profitable and more manageable to manufacture at home. 4) Finally, and most important of all, unlike the last 40 years, because of new technology, the U.S. has now identified an abundance of cheaply retrievable energy resources within its own borders. As a result, just a few policy changes could unleash a new era of robust economic growth in the U.S. Let’s hope those changes occur sooner rather than later!

 
Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value
Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, a Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.
 
Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.

The New Bank Paradigm: Squeezing Out the Private Sector

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, debt, Economic Growth, Economy, Europe, greece, Italy, Spain, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 3:08 PM by Robert Barone

Since the world adopted Basel I in 1988, it has allowed the Europeans to dictate the bank capital regime for major industrial economies. We are now in the process of adopting Basel III capital rules. Unfortunately, these rules have so biased the financial system that the private sector, the engine of job creation, has all but been squeezed out.Under all of the Basel regimes, “sovereign” debt is considered riskless. Everything else has a varying degree of risk to it which requires a capital reserve. Loans to the private sector have the highest capital requirements. Americans have always viewed our US Treasury debt as “riskless.” So, on the surface, it appears reasonable that no capital should be required, and Americans think no further. But, further thought would reveal two significant issues: 1) The “sovereign” debt of other countries may not be riskless (ask the private sector holders of Greek debt, or Jon Corzine and MF Global (MFGLQ) folks about the risks associated with Italian debt); 2) The bias imparted with this sort of capital regime makes loans to the private sector unattractive, especially in times of economic stress where bank capital is under pressure. But, it is in times of such stress that loans to the private sector are needed to create investment, capital spending, and jobs.

One of the reasons for all of the stress in Europe is the fact that their banking system holds huge amounts of periphery country debt (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy) with no capital backing. On a mark to market basis, most, if not all, of the capital of the periphery banks disappears. In fact, the European Central bank (ECB) itself is still carrying the Greek debt it holds on its books at par, as if there is no chance that they won’t be repaid in full.

Since the financial crisis of ’08-’09, Western banking systems have come to rely on government, at first as the capital provider of last resort, but now, at least in Greece and Spain, as the capital provider of first resort (most likely because there is no other). In a symbiotic relationship, those same governments have come to rely on the banks to purchase their excessive supply of debt. The capital rules favor this unhealthy relationship. In effect, we now have a banking DNA bias against private sector lending.

We have heard the politicians in Washington rail against the banks for not making loans to the private sector. Yet, all of the rules, regulations, and enforcement processes make it difficult, if not impossible, to do just that. The overbearing regulatory process strangles private sector lending at small community banks. And, as indicated above, the capital regime itself, which impacts all banks, discourages private sector loans. For example, a $1 million loan to the private sector requires $200,000 in capital backing plus an additional $20,000 to $30,000 in loss reserve contribution from the capital base. That same $1 million loan to the US Treasury, via purchases of Treasury securities, requires no capital or reserve contribution. The ultimate result is that, since the financial crisis when western governments found out that it was politically okay to “save” (i.e. recapitalize) large banks with public monies, they also found out that the capital and regulatory regime now made those same banks major buyers of excessive government debt.

Unfortunately, while governments like this and will continue to promote it because it keeps the cost of borrowing low and provides them with a ready market for deficit spending, government is not the economic engine. That is what the private sector is. Simply put, the banking model in the west now promotes moral hazard (banks making bets that are implicitly backed by taxpayers) and Too Big To Fail (TBTF) policies while it stifles private sector lending. The Dodd-Frank legislation has institutionalized this model with government intervention now seen as the first response to a banking issue. If it hasn’t, then why did President Obama say on The View the business day after JPMorgan Chase (JPM) announced its trading loss that it was a good thing that JPMorgan had a lot of capital else the government would have had to “step in.” Or why has Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s CEO, been required to testify before both House and Senate Committees about a loss of less than 3% of the bank’s $190 billion capital base? As further proof of government control of the banking system, the FDIC recently announced that, under its Dodd-Frank mandate, it is ready to take over any TBTF institution, “when the next crisis occurs.” Isn’t it clear that the relationship between the US federal government and the banking system is unhealthy, perhaps even incestuous, to the detriment of the private sector? That very same banking model is emerging in Europe with the emergency funding by the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) to recapitalize the Spanish banks and talk of a pan-European regulatory authority and deposit insurance.

The emerging banking model is one in which central governments and the money center banks co-exist in a mutual admiration society where government capitalizes the banks and the banks are the primary buyers of excessive government debt. Because government doesn’t create any real economic value (it regulates it and transfers it from one group to another), the domination of government assets on bank balance sheets in place of private sector assets spells real trouble for the future economic growth in the Western economies.

 
 
 
Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value
Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, a Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.
 
Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.

May 8, 2012

Chained-CPI is not an accurate deflation gauge

Posted in Ben Bernanke, Economy, Federal Reserve, Finance, government, Housing Market, IRS, medicare/medicaid, social security tagged , , , , , , , , , at 5:09 PM by Robert Barone

Circulating around the Beltway is a concept called Chained-Consumer Price Index (Chained-CPI). It is being billed as a new and “more accurate” way to measure the rate of inflation.In an April 25th article, the editors of Bloomberg View stated that the Chained-CPI “is a more accurate gauge of U.S. inflation that would yield immediate savings … The fix to this has already been endorsed by lawmakers in both parties, the Obama administration, many economists, and a series of bipartisan deficit-reduction panels.”According to Bloomberg View, the Chained-CPI is “a more exact measure that accounts for the substitutions consumers make when a product’s price goes up.” Remember this substitution concept, for, as you will see, it is the problem not the solution.
 
Currently, the most popular measure of inflation is the Consumer Price Index. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) produces several CPI measures monthly, but the one that makes the headlines is called CPI-U. In theory, CPI-U represents the buying patterns of all urban consumers.

This CPI measure is the “benchmark” that determines cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for a wide range of government programs, including Social Security, Medicare and government pensions. It is also widely used by the IRS in the tax code, in union contracts and in most long-term rental agreements.

The reality is that, like much of what comes out of Washington, the “Chained-CPI” concept is neither new nor more accurate. This chain-weighted concept is just another step in a series of steps that began in 1980 aimed at changing the CPI concept from one that measures the cost of maintaining “a constant standard of living” to measuring, really, not much at all, as I will explain later. The real purpose of altering the methodology is twofold: 1. To reduce the reported increase in inflation for political reasons; and 2. To lower future federal budget costs of Social Security, Medicare and government pensions by lowering the COLA adjustments without having to haveCongress vote for those or the administration sign it into law. Just note, however, what class bears the biggest burden of this – seniors and retirees.

The CPI rate of inflation reported for the year 2011 was approximately 3 percent. That was higher than what appears to be “tolerable” for America’s political class. But, we have a fairly recent concept called “core” CPI, which is the CPI-U excluding food and energy.

Both Fed chief Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Geithner believe that this is a better measure of “underlying” inflation. Apparently, they don’t believe that Americans are much impacted by the cost of petroleum products or food. I promise, however, that when the “core” CPI is higher than the CPI itself, “core” will be ignored!

If the methodology for computing the CPI-U were the same formula that was used in 1980, then the 3 percent rate of inflation reported for 2011 would have been closer to 11 percent, according to John Williams of Shadowstats.com, who follows this indicator in detail.  In 1980, the CPI measured a “standard of living,” with the price index telling us how many dollars more it would take to buy the exact same basket of items we bought in a prior period, say, last year. Below is a simple example using two goods: T-bone steaks and hamburger.

 

Weight (W)

Price (P)

W x P

T-Bone

50%

$10.00

$5.00

Hamburger

50%

$3.00

$1.50

   Index

 

 

$6.50

The table shows that the consumer has chosen, at current prices, to spend 50 percent of his/her budget on each item. The weighted index is $6.50. Now, assume that the price of T-bone steak rises to $12 while hamburger rises to $3.25. The table below shows that the weighted index would be $7.625.

 

Weight (W)

Price (P)

W x P

T-Bone

50%

$12.00

$6.000

Hamburger

50%

$3.25

$1.625

   Index

 

 

$7.625

That is, it now takes $7.625 to purchase what $6.50 used to purchase. What that says is that to maintain the “standard of living” that $6.50 used to buy now takes $7.625. So, prices have risen (i.e. inflation) by 17.3 percent [(7.625-6.5)/6.5].

We all know that when prices change, and especially if incomes are not rising as fast as prices, consumers substitute lower cost goods that usually are of lower quality. When that happens, the “standard of living” is clearly falling. The following is an example of how the Chained-CPI would significantly lower the reported inflation rate.

The table shows the same two goods, but because incomes have not risen, consumers have cut back T-bone steak to 40 percent of their budget and increased hamburger to 60 percent. As shown in the following table, the weighted index is $6.75 and the resulting reported rate of inflation is 3.8 percent [(6.75-6.50)/6.50)] rather than the 17.3 percent rate associated with maintaining a defined “standard of living” (i.e. 50 percent T-bone and 50 percent hamburger).

 

Weight (W)

Price (P)

W x P

T-Bone

40%

$12.00

$4.80

Hamburger

60%

$3.25

$1.95

   Index

 

 

$6.75

U.S. consumers already know that their living standard is being eroded, and that the reported rate of inflation understates reality. This has been the explanation of why. And, clearly, the “Chained-CPI” is not a “more accurate” gauge of inflation.

If you think about it, the two weighted average costs using different weights are not really comparable at all. What would you say if consumers had to substitute canned dog food for hamburger? Would you think the measure of inflation meant anything? The 3.8 percent is a math result, the product of numbers in a formula. But the numbers being used in the calculation measure different things and are not comparable. The result is that the Chained-CPI doesn’t really measure anything.

Nevertheless, the coming use of the Chained-CPI will allow reporting of much lower rates of inflation than is the reality, reducing Social Security, Medicare and government pension COLAs, all without any action on the part of Congress or the administration.

It also will distort to the upside the reporting of other economic activity where nominal” (i.e. current dollar) indicators, such as GDP, are translated into “real” terms by deflating them with an artificially low measure of inflation.

As I’ve said in many past blogs, much of the recession is being carried on the backs of those living on fixed incomes, savers, those living off of accumulated assets and retirees. Not only do they now get near 0 percent on their savings, but now they will be further cheated out of part of the COLA adjustments that would keep them at their current living standard via their Social Security, Medicare and, if a government retiree, pension. Isn’t it wonderful how government works?

April 9, 2012

Financial armageddon: Should you worry?

Posted in Armageddon, Banking, crises, debt, Economic Growth, Economy, Finance, government, Housing Market, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, IRS, medicare/medicaid, Nevada, payroll tax reductions, recession, social security, taxes tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 8:37 PM by Robert Barone

You’ve probably seen them in your email, or even on TV — I’m talking about the “approaching financial armageddon” forecasts. People must be responding to them, because they keep on appearing in my email — several per week, and others I know get them too. Should you be concerned?To answer this, we examine data from the six largest categories of Federal expenditures in 2000, 2012, projections for 2016, and their associated compounded annual growth rates (CAGR). Much of this data comes from USdebtclock.org. Caution, the website is not for the faint of heart.Six expense categories (Medicare/Medicaid, social security, income security, federal pensions, interest on debt and defense) account for nearly $3.1 trillion of spending in 2012, represent more than 86 percent of total federal spending and account for 137 percent of taxes collected. These six spending categories are critical when trying to understand the nature and extent of the structural deficit.Growth rates in CAGR show Medicare/Medicaid spending growing to $1,050 billion per year in 2016. The demographics of the U.S. population don’t show us getting younger and baby boomers are just beginning retirement. Social Security will also advance much more quickly than its 5.4 percent growth rate of the past 12 years. All in all, the projection of expenses I’ve shown in the table for 2016 ($3,692 versus $2,265 in 2012) appear quite optimistic. But, let’s go with it.Americans, in general, will tell you they oppose bigger government, at least in the abstract. But in poll after poll, when asked where Congress should make significant cost cuts, almost no specific program eliminations are favored by a majority of Americans. Given this predilection among Americans and assuming that these six categories again account for 86 percent of Federal spending in 2016, then, total Federal spending will be approximately $4.3 trillion.

Some analysts fret about the “fiscal cliff” on Jan. 1, 2013 when the Bush tax cuts are scheduled to expire along with the 2 percent payroll tax reduction for individual social security contributions.

Those analysts put the impact of these at a 3 to 4 percent GDP reduction. When the Bush tax cuts expire, the Federal government theoretically could collect about $300 billion more in taxes if economic activity were otherwise unchanged (a heroic assumption). In addition, the reinstatement of the 2 percent social security tax on individuals will add about $160 billion to tax revenues (again, assuming no decline). The breakout with this story is an estimate of what the deficit would be and its relationship to 2016 GDP. It assumes the Bush tax cuts have been eliminated, the payroll taxes are reinstated, and economic activity is not negatively impacted, so it is likely to understate the deficit. The tax revenue growth rates (left hand column) begin in 2013, after the “fiscal cliff.”

As you can see from the table, reinstatement of the Bush tax cuts and the payroll tax reductions alone do little to solve the issue, as the deficit remains at $1.54 trillion if no further tax increases occur.

 

OUR ‘FISCAL CLIFF’

If Tax CAGR is: Deficit/GDP will be: Deficit will be ($trills):
0% 9.1% $1.54
5% 6.6% $1.12
7% 5.5% $0.93
8% 4.9% $0.83
10% 3.7% $0.63
16% 0.0% $0.00
 
Such a tax regime will clearly keep the economy in a no growth or recessionary mode. If America resists the tax increases, then deficits will balloon, interest rates will rise as the world spurns the dollar, the Fed will continue to print money and purchase the debt that can’t be placed externally, a nasty inflation will likely set in (it has already begun — look at food and energy prices), and we will find ourselves in a Greek type tragedy. The only way out is to significantly cut the growth of Medicare/Medicaid, Social Security, Income Security and Federal Pensions. Which Congress and president will do that?So, should you be concerned about an approaching financial armageddon? Yes.
  

Robert Barone and Joshua Barone are Principals and Investment Advisor Representatives of Universal Value Advisors, LLC, Reno, NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor.

Statistics and other information have been compiled from various sources. Universal Value Advisors believes the facts and information to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee to the complete accuracy of this information.

Universal Value Advisors, LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its “Firm Brochure”, (Form ADV, Part 2A). A copy of this Brochure may be received by contacting the company at: 9222 Prototype Drive, Reno, NV 89521, Phone (775) 284-7778.

Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah
Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.

 Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.

 

March 26, 2012

Robert Barone: Is U.S. housing healing?

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, debt, Economic Growth, Economy, Finance, Foreclosure, government, Housing Market, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, Nevada, recession, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 5:15 PM by Robert Barone

Last Tuesday, a headline in the business media read: “U.S. housing heals as starts near three-year high.”
I scratched my head. The last three years have been the worst in recorded U.S. housing history. The accompanying chart tells the story. It is a real stretch to believe that this data indicates “healing.” Worse, everybody knows that the extremely mild winter has pulled demand forward; this is especially true for housing starts, as contractors don’t pour foundations in freezing weather, but use mild periods in the winter to get a head start for spring sales.
The data shown in this chart is “seasonally adjusted,” a statistical process that attempts to normalize fluctuations in data caused by such things as weather or holiday shopping. The seasonal adjustment process assumes January and February have typical winter weather. So, if the mild winter caused contractors to pour more foundations than they would have in a normal winter, then the seasonal adjustment process overstates what would be a normalized level of housing starts.
There is a similar story for sales of existing homes — the data was released last Wednesday. Because of the weather and other significant issues, I suspect that new starts and sales (where the “seasonal factors” normalize to the downside) will disappoint in the months ahead. Here’s why:
There are 3 important price categories: less than $300,000; $300,000 to $800,000; $800,000 and above.
There are three important buying groups: first-timers; move-ups; retirees. Generally, the first-timers purchase the under $300,000 homes, while the move-ups purchase in the other two categories. Retirees, usually sell from the upper two categories and “downsize.”
Government stimulus programs and record low interest rates have made homes the most affordable in decades (current index = 206; 100 means that a median income family can afford a median income home). First-time buyers can get a low down payment low interest rate loan (what happens if interest rates rise?), but those in the move-up category must rely on traditional bank-type financing, which requires a big down payment.
The home price downdraft since 2007 has taken many of the move-up buyers out of the market. CoreLogic data shows that 50 percent of current U.S. homeowners (the move-ups and the retirees) have less than 20 percent equity in their homes. That means that a significant percentage of move-ups cannot sell their existing home, pay a realtor’s commission (usually 6 percent), and have a 20 percent down payment for the move-up property.
History shows a healthy housing sector is critical to U.S. economic growth, and that when the move-ups are not healthy the sector does poorly.
Retirees are finding their homes are not worth what they thought. Their tendency is to stay put and wait for a better market. In fact, the media hype around “healing” is probably keeping them in their homes, as they now believe that a better market is just ahead! This is called “shadow” inventory, which means that the number of homes officially for sale understates the real supply.
With this view, we would expect the low-priced homes to be doing well but the upper two price brackets to be doing poorly. February data from Dataquick for the Southern California housing market confirms this view. First-time buyer price point sales (under $300,000) are up 9.5 percent from a year earlier, while the other two price point sales are both down (the $300,000 to $800,000 down by .8 percent, and the $800,000 and above down by 12.6 percent).
Nothing in this data, from the seasonal adjustment bias to the health of two of the three buying groups, tells me U.S. housing is healing.

March 15, 2012

Markets Hooked On Liquidity Drug From Central Bank Pushers

Posted in Banking, Ben Bernanke, CDS, Economy, Europe, Federal Reserve, Finance, Foreign, government, investment banking, investments, ISDA, QE3, recession, sovereign debt, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 10:04 PM by Robert Barone

From early last October to the end of last month, the S&P 500 rose 25%; amazing for an economy that is struggling to stay out of recession.  Then again, the equity markets are hooked on the liquidity drug.

When Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, in his recent semi-annual testimony before Congress, did not hint that QE3 was just around the corner, the market sold off.  When the European Central Bank broke its traditional role as lender of last resort and morphed into a gift giver to its member banks (to the tune of more than a trillion dollars), much like our Fed, the equity markets soared.

Money printing can’t go on forever, can it?

In every historical context, whenever the equity markets have a run up not based on economic fundamentals, eventually, they return to what those fundamentals dictate.  And here are some of the underlying economics:

  • There is no doubt that American manufacturing is undergoing a renaissance.  Labor costs in Asia are on a steep rise while wages here have been stagnant for several years.  Shipping costs, quality control and culture are other factors.  But, manufacturing represents less than 12% of GDP.  It, alone, cannot drive significant economic growth.
  • Gasoline prices are up more than $.60/gallon year to date with talk of $4.50 gas by summer. That cost/gallon is already here in some markets. Every penny increase drains $1.5 billion annually from other consumer discretionary spending.  That’s about $90 billion so far for 2012.  And what happens to gas prices if the Middle East flares up again?
  • While the first quarter is far from over, early data suggest a much softer than expected GDP.  Retail sales have been soft except for automobiles (pent-up demand or just a rush to buy fuel efficient vehicles ?).  Consumers (70% of GDP) have shown no real income growth for many quarters, and incomes are tumbling in Europe.  Inventories appear to be on the high side given the level of demand.  So additional production won’t be forthcoming.
  • Despite a reinstitution of 100% depreciation for capital equipment, much of that demand was pulled into 2011, as the business community was uncertain as to whether or not the tax break was going to be reinstated in 2012.    The state and local government sector is still in contraction, and, given the slowdown evident in the rest of the world, exports aren’t likely to add to GDP.  Of course, the market may like the softer side of GDP, as it likely ensures another dose of the liquidity drug from the money czar, Bernanke, the king of money printing.
  • Europe is sicker than the markets have priced in.  The hoopla around the Greek bailout is just another can kicking.  Because the Greek populace hasn’t accepted the idea that they have lived beyond their means for the past decade, austerity won’t be successful.  Politicians who promise to end the austerity are likely to be elected.  Eventually, Greece will need to have their own currency which can fluctuate in value vis a vis other currencies with commensurate interest rate levels.
  • It is rare that all of Europe is in recession at the same time.  The current market expectation is that Europe’s recession will be mild.  But, don’t forget, Germany’s biggest export clients are other European countries.  In fact, as a general rule, all of Europe’s economies export heavily to each other.  Being in recession together is going to have a large impact on those exports.  In addition, if the Euro remains at its current lofty level (above $1.30), it will be more difficult to export to non-EU countries.
  • The determination by the ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) that Greece officially defaulted on its debt when it invoked its recent legislatively passed “Collective Action Clause” to force investors to take losses is actually good news for the other so-called troubled European sovereigns (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Ireland) because it assures private sector investors that if they buy the so-called troubled foreign sovereign bonds, hedge them with Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and a Greek style default occurs, they will be paid at or near par value.  If the CDS payout had not been triggered, the private sector investors would view the purchase of such sovereign debt as having significantly more risk, and that would result in a much higher interest cost of that sovereign debt to the issuing countries.  In addition, it would throw the whole CDS concept into confusion, potentially impacting even the higher quality sovereigns like, Germany, the U.K., Canada, Australia, and even the U.S.
  • This is not to say that the world is now safe from financial contagion, as, in the context of world markets, Greece’s default is an expected and well prepared for event. The real worry should be if Spain (debt > $1 trillion) and/or Italy (debt> $2 trillion) default.  In addition, the CDS market is not transparent, and no one knows where the CDS obligations lie.  While a Portuguese and/or Irish default would have about the same individual impact as that of Greece (economies slightly smaller and not as indebted), we should worry that a rolling set of smaller defaults would eventually cause a major CDS insurer to fail due to the cumulative impact of the several defaults.  After all, it is likely that the CDS insurers who dabbled in Greek CDS, are also involved in CDS insurance of the other high debt European countries.  And, if a significant CDS insurer defaults (e.g., an institution similar in size and stature to AIG in 2009), we could, indeed, have contagion.
  • But even ignoring Greece for the short term, the ECB’s LTRO 1 and 2 appear to make Europe’s banks even more vulnerable.  Unlike the Fed, which purchased questionable assets from bank balance sheets and put them on its own, the ECB has not followed suit.  In fact, it stepped in and, by force majeure, inserted itself as senior to other bondholders holding the exact same Greek bonds, thus avoiding any losses in its own portfolio.  That makes losses for the private sector even greater.  Worse, it sours potential investors in European sovereign debt, seeing that they cannot easily quantify their risks as they can’t know how much of the same sovereign debt they own may be owned by the ECB.  This partially reverses the positive impact that the triggering of the CDS default will have on the European sovereign debt market.
  • Finally, the LTROs may make European banks even more insolvent than they are now, as they have been encouraged to take the cheap ECB funding and purchase European sovereigns for the interest spread (by Basle II and III rules, the debt of the European sovereigns is “riskless” and requires no capital backing on a bank’s balance sheet)!  Further sovereign debt crises, e.g., Portugal, Spain, or Italy, will eat away at already scarce European bank capital.  Contagion could very well result.

Looking at the GDP of Europe relative to China, if one includes all of the European Union countries and those closely related, Europe’s economy is about twice the size of China.  If China’s GDP growth went from 9% to 3%, the equity markets would certainly have a huge sell off.  But, it is likely that Europe’s GDP will fall from about 1.5% in 2011 to -1.5% in 2012, maybe even more than that.  Do the math!  This is equivalent to a Chinese hard landing.  As the European recession unfolds, the equity markets are likely to wake up.

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Speaking of China, a slowdown is clearly developing.  They actually ran a trade deficit for the first two months of 2012 signaling a real slowdown in exports.  Retail sales have been softer than expected and the real estate bubble there appears to be in the process of popping as property sales and prices are plunging.  No wonder the government recently lowered its official growth forecast from 8% to 7.5%.  This is not to say that China, itself, is entering a recession, but a slower growth rate there (2nd largest economy) in combination with growth issues in the US (largest economy), Japan (3rd largest), and a significant recession in Europe bodes ill for worldwide growth and will eventually play out in the equity markets.

The profit implications for multinational corporations of the severe recession in Europe, and a slowdown in China and elsewhere are significant.  Analysts have continued to forecast rapid earnings growth and high profit margins even in the face of rising energy and food costs and stagnant U.S. and falling European incomes.  Using such rosy profit forecasts makes the market look undervalued.  However, a 15% – 20% profit decline is normal for a recessionary world.  If you plug that in, the equity markets look overvalued today.

Wasn’t it somewhere around this time last year that the equity markets were also priced for perfection?  Didn’t we hear that the economy had achieved “escape” velocity and that the recovery was about to accelerate?  And, didn’t the market sink when the economy fizzled and needed the QE2 liquidity drug injection?  In fact, the S&P 500 ended 2011 at exactly the point where it began, with a lot of volatility in between.  So far, 2012 appears to be following 2011′s path.

Robert Barone and Joshua Barone are Principals and Investment Advisor Representatives of Universal Value Advisors, LLC, Reno, NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor.

Statistics and other information have been compiled from various sources. Universal Value  Advisors believes the facts and information to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee to the complete accuracy of this information.

Universal Value Advisors, LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United   States. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its “Firm Brochure”, (Form ADV, Part 2A). A copy of this Brochure may be received by contacting the company at: 9222 Prototype Drive, Reno, NV 89521, Phone (775) 284-7778.

Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, GeorgetownUniversity) is a Principal of Universal Value Advisors (UVA),Reno,NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor.  Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee. 

Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy.  A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at:9222 Prototype Dr.,Reno,NV 89521.  Ph: (775) 284-7778.

 

March 13, 2012

Greece Default Declaration Stabilizes CDS Markets

Posted in Banking, Bankruptcy, Big Banks, Bonds, credit default swap, debt, derivatives, Economy, Europe, Finance, Foreign, government, International Swaps and Derivatives, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, ISDA, Nevada, sovereign debt tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 3:10 PM by Robert Barone

NEW YORK (TheStreet) — The determination by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association that Greece officially defaulted on its debt when it invoked its recent legislatively passed “Collective Action Clause” to force investors to take losses is actually good news for the other so-called troubled European sovereigns like Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland.

The ISDA determination assures private sector investors that if they buy the so-called troubled foreign sovereign bonds, hedge them with credit default swaps and a Greek style default occurs, they will be paid at or near par value.

If the CDS payout had not been triggered, the private sector investors would view the purchase of such sovereign debt as having significantly more risk, and that would result in a much higher interest cost of that sovereign debt to the issuing countries. In addition, it would throw the whole CDS concept into confusion, potentially impacting even the higher quality sovereigns like, Germany, the U.K., Canada, Australia, and even the U.S.

According to the ISDA, about $3.16 billion of Greek debt is covered by the CDS (4,323 swap contracts). On March 19, an auction will be held which will set the “recovery” value on the Greek bonds. The difference between that recovery value and par will be the payout of the CDS.

For example, if the auction results in a recovery value of 20%, then the CDS payment will be 80%, or about $2.5 billion. This is not a large amount in the context of world markets, and it would be a surprise if any viable CDS issuer will be greatly impacted, although it does appear that Austria’s KA Finanz, the “bad” bank that was created in 2008 when Kommunalkredit Austria AG was nationalized and given all of the “distressed” assets, will be stuck with CDS losses in excess of $550 billion which will require the Austrian government to step up with a significant capital injection.

The “non-eventness” of the CDS payouts is a result of the fact that there has been a long lead time for the issuers to adjust their risk portfolios to deal with the likelihood of a Greek default. Over the past year, the amount of Greek debt covered by the CDS has halved. Compare this to the Lehman default of $5.2 billion where there was almost no lead time between the emergence of the Lehman issue and its bankruptcy filing.

It was the lack of such a lead time that caught CDS issuers, like American International Group(AIG), with no time to adjust their risk portfolios, and required government intervention to prevent a domino default effect. With Greece, no such domino effect is expected although there is always the possibility (albeit low) of a surprise. We will know that soon after the March 19 auction when settlement must occur.

This is not to say that the world is now safe from financial contagion, as, in the context of world markets, Greece’s default is an expected and well prepared for event. The real worry should be if Spain, with a debt of about $1 trillion and/or Italy with a debt of about $2 trillion default.

In addition, the CDS market is not transparent, and no one knows where the CDS obligations lie. While a Portuguese and/or Irish default would have about the same individual impact as that of Greece (economies slightly smaller and not as indebted), we should worry that a rolling set of smaller defaults would eventually cause a major CDS insurer to fail due to the cumulative impact of the several defaults.

After all, it is likely that the CDS insurers who dabbled in Greek CDS, are also involved in CDS insurance of the other high debt European countries. And, if a significant CDS insurer defaults (e.g., an institution similar in size and stature to AIG in 2009), we could, indeed, have contagion.

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