July 9, 2012

Economic issues, good and bad

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, debt, Economic Growth, Economy, Europe, Federal Reserve, Finance, government, greece, Housing Market, International Swaps and Derivatives, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, Italy, recession, sovereign debt, Spain, taxes, Unemployment tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 3:17 PM by Robert Barone

This is a mid-year overview of the economic and policy issues in the U.S. and worldwide, both positive and negative. I have divided the issues into economic and policy issues. With enough political will, policy issues can be addressed in the short run, while economic issues are longer-term in nature and are clearly influenced by policy.

Positives

• Cheap energy (economics and policy): There is growing recognition that cheap energy is key to economic growth; the next boom will be based on cheap energy.
 
• Manufacturing (economics): After years of decline, American manufacturing is in a renaissance, led by the auto industry.

• Corporate health (economics): Large corporations are extremely healthy with large cash hoards and many have low cost and low levels of debt.

• Politics (policy): Americans are tired of special interests’ ability to pay for political favors.

 
Negatives
 
• Recession in Europe (economics): This has implications for world growth because Europe’s troubled banks are the engines of international lending; Europe’s economy rivals that of the U.S. in size.

• European Monetary Union (policy): A Greek exit from the euro is still probable after recent election and is likely to spread contagion to Portugal, Spain and even Italy. There is also danger here to America’s financial system.

• Brazil, Russia, India, China or the BRIC, Growth Rate (economics): China appears to be in danger of a hard landing, as is Brazil. India is already there. This has serious implications for commodity producers like Canada and Australia.

• Fiscal cliff and policy uncertainties (policy): A significant shock will occur to the U.S. economy if tax policy (Bush tax cut expiration and reinstatement of the 2 percent payroll tax) isn’t changed by Jan. 1, 2013.

• Entitlements (policy): Mediterranean Europe is being crushed under the burden of entitlements; the U.S. is not far behind. This is the most serious of the fiscal issues but the hardest for the political system to deal with.

• Housing (economic & policy): In the U.S., housing appears to have found a bottom, but because of falling prices and underwater homeowners, a significant recovery is still years away. Housing is a huge issue in Europe, especially Spain, and it will emerge as an issue in Australia and Canada if China has a hard landing.

• Energy costs (economics & policy): The current high cost of energy is killing worldwide growth (see “Positives” above).

• U.S. taxmageddon (policy): The U.S. tax system discourages savings and investment (needed for growth), encourages debt and favors specific groups.

• Too Big To Fail (TBTF) (policy): The U.S. financial system is dominated by TBTF institutions that use implicit government backing to take unwarranted risk; TBTF has now been institutionalized by the Dodd-Frank legislation; small institutions that lend to small businesses are overregulated and are disappearing.

• Debt overhang (economics): The federal government, some states and localities and many consumers have too much debt; the de-leveraging that must occur stunts economic growth.

• Inflation (economics & policy): Real inflation is much higher than officially reported. If a true inflation index were used, it is likely that the data would show that the recession still hasn’t ended.

It is clear from the points above and from the latest data reports that worldwide, most major economies are slowing. It is unusual to have them all slowing at the same time and thus, the odds of a worldwide recession are quite high.

In the context of such an event or events, the U.S. will likely fare better than most. But that doesn’t mean good times, just better than its peers. There is also greater potential of destabilizing events (oil and Iran, contagion from Europe, Middle East unrest), which may have negative economic impacts worldwide. Thus, in the short-term it appears that the U.S. economy will continue its lackluster performance with a significant probability of an official recession and vulnerable to shock type events. (Both the fixed income and the equity markets seem to be signaling this.)

 
 
The extension of Operation Twist by the Federal Reserve on June 20 (the Fed will swap $267 billion of short-term Treasury notes for long-term ones through Dec. 31 which holds long-term rates down) was expected, and continues the low interest rate policy that has been in place for the past four years. That means interest rates will continue to remain low for several more years no matter who is elected in November. Robust economic growth will only return when policies regarding the issues outlined in the table are addressed.

Looking back at my blogs over the years, I have always been early in identifying trends. The positive trends are compelling despite the fact that the country must deal with huge short-term issues that will, no doubt, cause economic dislocation.

The only question is when the positives will become dominant economic forces, and that is clearly dependent on when enabling policies are adopted. 1) In the political arena, there is a growing restlessness by America’s taxpayers over Too Big To Fail and political practices where money and lobbyists influence policy and law (e.g., the Taxmageddon code). 2) The large cap corporate sector is healthier now than at any time in modern history. Resources for economic growth and expansion are readily available. Only a catalyst is needed. 3) America is on the “comeback” trail in manufacturing. Over the last decade, Asia’s wages have caught up.

Cultural differences and expensive shipping costs are making it more profitable and more manageable to manufacture at home. 4) Finally, and most important of all, unlike the last 40 years, because of new technology, the U.S. has now identified an abundance of cheaply retrievable energy resources within its own borders. As a result, just a few policy changes could unleash a new era of robust economic growth in the U.S. Let’s hope those changes occur sooner rather than later!

 
Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value
Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, a Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.
 
Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.

The New Bank Paradigm: Squeezing Out the Private Sector

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, debt, Economic Growth, Economy, Europe, greece, Italy, Spain, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 3:08 PM by Robert Barone

Since the world adopted Basel I in 1988, it has allowed the Europeans to dictate the bank capital regime for major industrial economies. We are now in the process of adopting Basel III capital rules. Unfortunately, these rules have so biased the financial system that the private sector, the engine of job creation, has all but been squeezed out.Under all of the Basel regimes, “sovereign” debt is considered riskless. Everything else has a varying degree of risk to it which requires a capital reserve. Loans to the private sector have the highest capital requirements. Americans have always viewed our US Treasury debt as “riskless.” So, on the surface, it appears reasonable that no capital should be required, and Americans think no further. But, further thought would reveal two significant issues: 1) The “sovereign” debt of other countries may not be riskless (ask the private sector holders of Greek debt, or Jon Corzine and MF Global (MFGLQ) folks about the risks associated with Italian debt); 2) The bias imparted with this sort of capital regime makes loans to the private sector unattractive, especially in times of economic stress where bank capital is under pressure. But, it is in times of such stress that loans to the private sector are needed to create investment, capital spending, and jobs.

One of the reasons for all of the stress in Europe is the fact that their banking system holds huge amounts of periphery country debt (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy) with no capital backing. On a mark to market basis, most, if not all, of the capital of the periphery banks disappears. In fact, the European Central bank (ECB) itself is still carrying the Greek debt it holds on its books at par, as if there is no chance that they won’t be repaid in full.

Since the financial crisis of ’08-’09, Western banking systems have come to rely on government, at first as the capital provider of last resort, but now, at least in Greece and Spain, as the capital provider of first resort (most likely because there is no other). In a symbiotic relationship, those same governments have come to rely on the banks to purchase their excessive supply of debt. The capital rules favor this unhealthy relationship. In effect, we now have a banking DNA bias against private sector lending.

We have heard the politicians in Washington rail against the banks for not making loans to the private sector. Yet, all of the rules, regulations, and enforcement processes make it difficult, if not impossible, to do just that. The overbearing regulatory process strangles private sector lending at small community banks. And, as indicated above, the capital regime itself, which impacts all banks, discourages private sector loans. For example, a $1 million loan to the private sector requires $200,000 in capital backing plus an additional $20,000 to $30,000 in loss reserve contribution from the capital base. That same $1 million loan to the US Treasury, via purchases of Treasury securities, requires no capital or reserve contribution. The ultimate result is that, since the financial crisis when western governments found out that it was politically okay to “save” (i.e. recapitalize) large banks with public monies, they also found out that the capital and regulatory regime now made those same banks major buyers of excessive government debt.

Unfortunately, while governments like this and will continue to promote it because it keeps the cost of borrowing low and provides them with a ready market for deficit spending, government is not the economic engine. That is what the private sector is. Simply put, the banking model in the west now promotes moral hazard (banks making bets that are implicitly backed by taxpayers) and Too Big To Fail (TBTF) policies while it stifles private sector lending. The Dodd-Frank legislation has institutionalized this model with government intervention now seen as the first response to a banking issue. If it hasn’t, then why did President Obama say on The View the business day after JPMorgan Chase (JPM) announced its trading loss that it was a good thing that JPMorgan had a lot of capital else the government would have had to “step in.” Or why has Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s CEO, been required to testify before both House and Senate Committees about a loss of less than 3% of the bank’s $190 billion capital base? As further proof of government control of the banking system, the FDIC recently announced that, under its Dodd-Frank mandate, it is ready to take over any TBTF institution, “when the next crisis occurs.” Isn’t it clear that the relationship between the US federal government and the banking system is unhealthy, perhaps even incestuous, to the detriment of the private sector? That very same banking model is emerging in Europe with the emergency funding by the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) to recapitalize the Spanish banks and talk of a pan-European regulatory authority and deposit insurance.

The emerging banking model is one in which central governments and the money center banks co-exist in a mutual admiration society where government capitalizes the banks and the banks are the primary buyers of excessive government debt. Because government doesn’t create any real economic value (it regulates it and transfers it from one group to another), the domination of government assets on bank balance sheets in place of private sector assets spells real trouble for the future economic growth in the Western economies.

 
 
 
Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value
Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, a Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.
 
Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.

May 24, 2012

Too Big to Fail: Four Years Later, Things Are Riskier Than Ever

Posted in Banking, Ben Bernanke, Big Banks, Europe, Federal Reserve, Finance, greece, investment banking, investments tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 7:58 PM by Robert Barone

The turmoil in Europe, trading losses at JPMorgan (JPM), and recent revelations about naked short-selling by Goldman Sachs (GS) and Bank of America-Merrill Lynch (BAC) should be giving every American and every policy maker heartburn because each and every one of these issues has potential to cause systemic financial shocks. It all ultimately comes down to the continuing saga of “Too Big to Fail,” or TBTF. TBTF nearly brought the financial system down in ’08 and ’09. It was supposed to be fixed by the Dodd-Frank legislation. But today, the TBTF institutions are even bigger than they were in ’08.

European Worries

On a daily basis, reports indicate that instability is growing in the European Monetary Union’s (or EMU) banking system. There have been outright runs on Greek institutions and rumored runs on Spanish banks. In Greece, it’s been reported that some businesses will not accept euro notes (i.e., the paper currency) issued by the Greek central bank for fear that if Greece leaves the EMU, those notes will be turned into new drachmas, which will be worth only a fraction of what real euros are worth.

In the US, the paper currency is issued by a Federal Reserve Bank. There is a number on each bill (1 to 12) that shows which Federal Reserve Bank was the issuer. Like the US, each participating central bank in the EMU can issue currency; the first letter of the serial number is coded to indicate which bank issued it. Currency issued by the Greek central bank is coded with a “Y.” Some Greeks are demanding currency coded with an “X” ( i.e., Germany).

There are growing worries about European bank solvency, and Moody’s recently downgraded a significant number of the larger Spanish and Italian banks. If Greece leaves the EMU, contagion could result. If funding markets for European banks freeze (causing one or several institutions to be unable to meet their daily liquidity requirements), there is a high probability that any contagion would spread to US financial institutions.

At the very least, the interrelationships between large US and European institutions will cause significant issues if a fat tail event occurs on the continent.

In fact, on March 21, Fed Chairman Bernanke warned Congress that the risks of impacts from such events on US banks and money market funds appeared to be significant.

Lack of Internal Controls at TBTF Institutions

On May 11, Jamie Dimon announced that JPMorgan had lost $2 billion or more in a failed “hedge” trade. Since then, the estimates of the loss have escalated; some think it could be as much as $5 billion – $7 billion. This shows that even the best-of-breed bankers, like Mr. Dimon, are unable to place sufficient internal controls over the riskiest of operations.

Over the past several years, we’ve seen such trading blow-ups at several of the TBTF institutions. The so-called “Volcker Rule,” a portion of the Dodd-Frank legislation that is supposedly effective this fall, should prevent “proprietary trading” at the TBTF institutions. But many think that such rules will be easy to get around; Mr. Dimon has indicated that this huge loss was due to a failed “hedge,” and not proprietary trading. JPMorgan had $182 billion in capital according to their March 31 filings, so the loss of a few billion isn’t going to put this institution in any danger or require any taxpayer assistance.

However, on the Monday after the JPMorgan announcement (May 14), President Obama appeared on ABC’s The View and commented that it was a good thing that JPMorgan had plenty of capital, noting that had this happened at a weaker bank, “[W]e could have had to step in.”

Think about this statement. The first reaction to stress in the financial system is for the government to step in! Compare that to the first Chrysler bailout in 1979. At that time, Lee Iacocca, Chrysler’s Chairman and CEO, had to beg Congress for nearly four months for a loan guarantee (not a direct loan) of $1.5 billion.

In fact, the day before Mr. Dimon announced JPMorgan’s large loss problem, the FDIC’s acting Chairman, Martin Gruenberg, announced plans and procedures for the FDIC to seize large financial institutions “when the next crisis brings a major financial firm to its knees.” Instead of getting rid of TBTF, it is now institutionalized. The FDIC’s announced plans are simply in accordance with Dodd-Frank.

During the week of May 14, the lawyers representing Goldman Sachs and Bank of America-Merrill Lynch in a lawsuit filed by Overstock.com filed an unredacted set of documents with the court (i.e., the whole document was submitted instead of only certain parts), thus putting them into the public domain.

Those documents revealed that these TBTF institutions knowingly ignored the laws and regulations against “naked” short-selling. When one sells “short,” one must first borrow the stock, or else there is nothing to prevent someone shorting (i.e., selling) so many shares as to significantly and negatively impact the market price for the stock (which is what a short-seller hopes for). “Naked” short-selling occurs when the stock is sold without borrowing it from another owner, and three business days later, the seller “fails” to deliver the stock.

Because of their size and power, the TBTF banks could depress the stock price of any company they choose. If one of their units puts a “sell” recommendation out and the trading department “naked” short-sells, then the “sell” recommendation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This, in fact, is what Overstock.com’s lawsuit has been about.

So let’s review:

1. Bernanke worries that European bank insolvencies or liquidity issues may have significant systemic impacts on US financial institutions – if anyone knows, he should know.2. JPMorgan’s losses elicited a response from the US president about the immediate active role of government with regard to issues at the TBTF banks.3. The FDIC announced its policies, plans, and procedures to seize TBTF institutions when the next financial crisis occurs.

4. It has come to light that some TBTF institutions have skirted laws and regulations.

If there were no TBTF institutions in the US, then little of the above would be of concern. Instead:

1. While the European contagion would still be a worry, it wouldn’t be as much of a worry regarding its risk to our entire financial system because no one institution alone would be a systemic risk.2. The government shouldn’t ever have to “step in” if a bank failed. Sure, there would be market reaction and shareholders and bondholders would have consequences, but as long as the failed institution couldn’t cause systemic issues, there would be no need for government (taxpayer) involvement.3. The expensive and extensive policies and processes now being set up at FDIC would be unnecessary.

4. Without the power that comes with being TBTF, the “naked” short-selling and other abuses would be much less effective or profitable.

5. The TBTF institutions are so complex that even the likes of a Jamie Dimon can’t provide effective internal controls and risk management. Smaller institutions that have such issues won’t cause systemic risk.

The lessons of the ’08-’09 near systemic meltdown were clear: TBTF is a huge policy issue. Unfortunately, after Dodd-Frank, not only are TBTF institutions bigger and systemically more risky, but we now have a government all too willing, and maybe even eager, to “step in.”

 

Robert Barone and Joshua Barone are Principals and Investment Advisor Representatives of Universal Value Advisors, LLC, Reno, NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor.  Statistics and other information have been compiled from various sources. Universal Value Advisors believes the facts and information to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee to the complete accuracy of this information.
 
Universal Value Advisors, LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its “Firm Brochure”, (Form ADV, Part 2A). A copy of this Brochure may be received by contacting the company at: 9222 Prototype Drive, Reno, NV 89521, Phone (775) 284-7778.

Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the
Investment Committee.

Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.

May 21, 2012

Rebellion Against Austerity From Greece To Washington

Posted in Economy, Europe, government, greece, investment banking, investments, QE3, recession, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 10:38 PM by Robert Barone

Since the initial euro crisis erupted in Greece two years ago, I have speculated that the necessary move toward austerity would be sidetracked by a political response from the impacted populations, which would elect leaders who promised a move away from such austerity. I didn’t realize how rapid and rabid the response would be.
 
The table below shows a list of headline anti-austerity movements, and, yes, I’ve included such movements in the U.S.
 
Country
Anti-Austerity Development
France The May 6th election of Hollande, a leader who promised more government spending, higher taxes and a reduction in the retirement age, at a time when budget deficits and austerity are key issues.
Greece Greek voters flocked to anti-austerity parties during the May 6th elections, stoking concern in Europe that austerity may be derailed.
Ireland Sentiment has turned sour on austerity with elections scheduled this spring.
Argentina Nationalization of Spanish owner Repsol’s (REP) 51% stake in YPF (YPF), a major oil producer.
Bolivia Seizure of Spanish power grid operator Red Electrica’s (REE.MC) 57% ownership of a Bolivian power line company which controlled 85% of the power lines in the country.
Spain Inability (or lack of determination) to meet promised austerity targets.
U.S. Political attack on the so-called wealthy and on cash rich corporations for not paying their “fair share” of taxes, in order to keep from having to cut spending.
 
Much of the backlash is occurring because governments can no longer fulfill the promises made, whether they be in transfer payments, services, or salaries and benefits, etc., due to shortfall of revenue and a remarkable growth in public debt burdens. As is clear now, it is one thing for politicians to talk about austerity, and another to live with the immediate consequences, often resulting in higher unemployment and recession.
 
Europe
 
Naturally, the hotbed of anti-austerity is Europe where they have long lived the entitlement life. Europe is clearly in recession, and it appears that it will be a long and deep one. The latest data from Europe shows that the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) for March was 43.8 (where 50 is the line of demarcation between contraction and expansion). In Spain, now officially in recession, the PMI was 43.5, and in depression wracked Greece, it is 40.7. The manufacturing indexes in Europe are also contracting. The manufacturing PMI in France in March was 46.9, and even in mighty Germany, the manufacturing index was 46.2.
 
Spain’s unemployment rate is over 24%; Greece’s more than 21%. In Europe, the number of unemployed stands at 17.4 million, an increase of more than 1.7 million in the past year. The official unemployment rate in the European Union will soon surpass 11%. So, it isn’t any wonder that those politicians that have adopted the Robin Hood approach have gained populist support. After all, politics are politics – and populations used to entitlements naturally vote for candidates that promise to give them something, usually by taking it away from someone else.
 
When the European Central Bank (ECB) embarked upon its Long Term Refunding Operations (LTRO1 and LTRO2), which gave all European banks access to 1% money for 3 years in order to stave off a rapidly approaching financial crisis in those banks, there was an unwritten quid pro quo. The bargain was the liquidity to stave off the financial crisis, and, in return, the member countries would have to embark upon a path of fiscal reform–austerity–that is now being unwound.
 
The question is, will the ECB continue along this money printing path to stave off the next phase of the financial crisis if the member countries have shunned their part of the bargain? Or, will the new and emerging concept of a European “growth pact” give the ECB the political cover it needs to continue printing. I suspect the latter.
 
The concept of a “growth pact” is nothing new to Europe. Austerity in the ’90s morphed into the “Stability and Growth Pact” (SGP), and it appears to be doing so again. The idea is to have the economy “grow” so that tax collections rise and deficits are reduced. Who can oppose that idea? Unfortunately, there is little that the European governments can do pro-actively to spur such growth.
 
The best thing would be to get out of the way of the private sector, but such ideas are anathema. Nevertheless, the Keynesian hope is that more deficit stimulus and more money printing with less austerity will prove to be the cure. I doubt this approach will be anything more than further can kicking. Furthermore, it is a dangerous game, especially in the hands of politicians, because even the “growth pact” still demands discipline in the budget and spending process.
 
In Greece, no government has been formed from the May 6th election results which pits polar opposite political views among the highest vote getters. The leader of the party with the second most votes ran on a platform to renege on the austerity agreements already in place with the external financing partners, to raise public pension payments and salaries, etc. And that leader seems to have gained even more popularity for the upcoming June elections. At current spending rates, Greece will run out of funds to pay its obligations by the end of June. And, it will be up to the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) to determine if Greece will get its next tranche of external financing (i.e., loans).
 
It appears that Europe is moving perilously closer to financial chaos. A Greek default on its external debt could easily result in a disorderly withdrawal from the EMU (European Monetary Union), which could trigger worldwide financial instability. Imagine if you were a Greek citizen and you woke up one morning to find that the euros in your local bank had been converted to new drachmas on a 1:1 basis. Later that day you discover that your new drachmas are worth substantially less than the euros you had yesterday. People aren’t dumb. Over the past few months, we have observed, through the borrowings at the ECB, a growing silent run on European banks in the at-risk countries (Spain, Italy). Italy even limited the amount of cash a bank can give its clients. And now, there is an outright run on Greek Banks.A Greek dismissal or withdrawal from the EMU along with its default on external debt is likely to trigger massive outright runs on Spanish, Italian and other weak European banks. The domino effects of this are unknown – all the way from other weak EMU partners electing the Greek path to a complete implosion of the EMU. The impacts will be worldwide. Expect volatility in markets and significant U.S. dollar strength.

 
The Americas
 
The U.S. isn’t too far behind Europe in the entitlement game as it has caught up rapidly over the past decade. But, in the U.S., the anti-austerity movement has taken a slightly different track. The ploy here is to avoid the basic issue of federal government overspending, over indebtedness and over promises. So, the greedy and evil corporations, which “evade” just and fair taxes, are blamed for the deficit because they refuse to pay their “fair share.” And those same corporations that “hoard” cash are responsible for lack of job growth because they won’t spend and invest those cash hoards.
 
The simple truth is that Apple (AAPL), Microsoft (MSFT), Wal-Mart (WMT), and all of the others are simply playing the tax game that was written and is orchestrated by none other than the politicians themselves. In what remains of our capitalist system, corporate managers are supposed to maximize profits, and one doesn’t do that without uncovering every dollar-saving loophole written into the tax code.
 
As for the cash, much of it remains offshore because it would be taxed if brought back. But it remains unused because of the ongoing uncertainties today’s politicians have imposed. No tax law is now permanent or at least has a long enough life for corporate managers to make prudent investment decisions. Most have a one or two year life (Bush tax cut extensions, payroll tax reduction, depreciation laws, etc.). Without some certainty about the tax code, about deficits, or about the cost of energy, those cash hoards simply won’t be invested – at least not in the U.S or other slow growth industrial countries.
 
This rhetoric is really a diversion from the real issue of too much debt, unsustainable deficits, and living beyond our means. The size of government is being addressed at most state and local levels (even by Jerry Brown in California, but definitely not at the federal level.
 
Unfortunately, the movement away from austerity either prolongs the crisis, or makes it ultimately worse. In Bolivia, the series of nationalizations that began in ’06 (natural gas fields) are now causing capital formation issues. The gas wells are producing less, as is the normal course for such wells, but there is no internal capital for new exploration (all the capital that could, fled long ago), and foreign capital simply won’t go there based upon the last six years of political behavior and private sector confiscation (besides Bolivia, the other Latin American countries with extreme left wing governments are Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, and Nicaragua).
 
As is evident in places like Bolivia and Venezuela, the move away from austerity via class warfare, confiscation, and nationalizations only prolongs the economic problems, usually making them far worse than the original austerity would have imposed.
 
Conclusion
 
The point is, “taxing the rich,” attacking successful corporations, nationalizing industries, or simply allowing government to pick the winners and the losers does nothing to create economic growth or jobs. It does just the opposite. Austerity, in some form, is necessary to pay back the over borrowing and over consuming of the past. There is no way around it.
 
Printing more money, running high deficits and taxing the productive members of society will not fix the growth and jobs issues. Rejecting the necessary austerity will just exacerbate the problem(s) or shift the burdens to other unsuspecting citizens, like seniors, retirees, or onto future generations through high or hyper inflation.
 
Erskine Bowles, a Democrat, co-chair of President Obama’s Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, and co-author of the Simpson-Bowles fiscal plan said this to the Council on Foreign Relations on April 24th:
 
Without serious debt reduction, it won’t take much of an increase in interest rates to create a fiscal crisis for the country the likes of which only those who lived through the Great Depression can recall. Once interest rates reach a level that reflects the genuine risk inherent in our ongoing fiscal mismanagement, and debt service eats up more and more of a shrinking pie, the financial crisis we just lived through (and are still living through) will seem like a sideshow… Deficits are truly like a cancer and over time they are going to destroy our country from within.
 
Most industrial countries with large fiscal deficits have a choice between something bad (austerity now) and something awful (high inflation, hyperinflation, social upheaval, or worse). While no one likes austerity, the consequences of choosing to kick the can further down the road are much worse. Yet, that is clearly what is happening with likely dire financial consequences, perhaps as soon as Greece formally defaults. Nonetheless, at this particular moment, “austerity” has become just another dirty word.
 
Robert Barone and Joshua Barone are Principals and Investment Advisor Representatives of Universal Value Advisors, LLC, Reno, NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor.  Statistics and other information have been compiled from various sources. Universal Value Advisors believes the facts and information to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee to the complete accuracy of this information.
 
Universal Value Advisors, LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its “Firm Brochure”, (Form ADV, Part 2A). A copy of this Brochure may be received by contacting the company at: 9222 Prototype Drive, Reno, NV 89521, Phone (775) 284-7778.Robert Barone (Ph.D., Economics, Georgetown University) is a Principal of Universal Value Advisors (UVA), Reno, NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor. Dr. Barone is a former Director of the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, and is currently a Director of Allied Mineral Products, Columbus, Ohio, AAA Northern California, Nevada, Utah Auto Club, and the associated AAA Insurance Company where he chairs the Investment Committee.

Information cited has been compiled from various sources which UVA believes to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee as to its accuracy. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices is contained in its “Firm Brochure” (Form ADV, Part 2A) which may be obtained by contacting UVA at: 9222 Prototype Dr., Reno, NV 89521. Ph: (775) 284-7778.

February 16, 2012

Debunking the Warren Buffett Tax Deception

Posted in Economy, Finance, government, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, IRS, local banks, taxes tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 10:10 PM by Robert Barone

It is an election year, so the media makes a big deal out of Warren Buffett’s assertion that the tax system unfairly taxes his supposedly “working class” secretary at 33% (we’ve also seen 34% and 35.8%), while he only pays 13.7% (we’ve also seen 17.4%) on the millions that he makes.

The political implication is that he, and others like him, such as GOP hopeful Mitt Romney, somehow aren’t paying their “fair share” of taxes.

But instead of doing even superficial analysis, the media carries the story at face value. That is naive. Even a slight amount of digging will turn this story upside down.

Let’s start with Buffett’s secretary, Debbie Bosanek. In order to pay a marginal tax rate of 33% (or 34% or 35.8%), she would have to be in Occupy Wall Street’s 1%, not the 99%. Using the 2011 tax tables for individuals, if she were single making a $250,000 adjusted gross income (that’s after deductions!), she would be in the 33% marginal tax bracket and would have a 27% effective tax rate. To get to the 35% marginal tax bracket, her adjusted gross income would have to be more than $379,000. Isn’t a $250,000 income the magic line that [President Barack] Obama has drawn that demarcates those who he is targeting as “rich” and should be paying more taxes? So, let’s not be deluded into thinking that his woman somehow represents America’s working class.

But the bigger deception is Buffett’s claim that he pays a much lower tax rate than he supposedly should. A quick review of business taxation in the US today will show that Buffett pays in excess of 30% of his income in taxes.

Most small-business owners choose the Subchapter-S or LLC format for their businesses. Any profit from their business flows directly to their personal taxes (form 1040). Assume two similar businesses, one owned by X and the other by Y. Both businesses make $450,000 in pretax income. Owner X has chosen the LLC format. Owner X’s company pays no taxes to the IRS, but sends Owner X a K-1 requiring X to declare $450,000 on his form 1040. His marginal tax bracket is 35%.

Owner Y has chosen the C-Corp format. Y’s company also had a pretax income of $450,000, which is taxed at the corporate 35% tax rate. Y has chosen to declare a $50,000 dividend to himself which shows up on his 1040 and is taxed at 15%. Looking only at his 1040, you would think that Y doesn’t pay much in taxes. In fact, Y pays more taxes than X because the dividend is double taxed – that is why most small businesses choose the LLC or Sub-S format.

Now let’s talk about Buffett. He is famous for buying large stakes or even controlling interests in large C-Corps. He is the equivalent to Owner Y.   So, the taxes that Buffett pays go well beyond what is shown on his 1040. Like Owner Y, the 13.7% rate on Buffett’s 1040 shows only the taxes he pays on the dividends and therefore is only part of the story. I looked up Buffett’s 13F SEC filing dated January 30, 2011. That filing shows nine major holdings.

Using the share price of each holding and the number of shares shown on the 13F, I estimated the value of each of those holdings. Then, using the C-Corp’s reported effective tax rate, the pretax income per share, and the dividends per share (taxed at 15%), I calculated Buffett’s effective tax rate on each holding. Finally, using the market value of each holding to form a weighted average, I then calculated that Buffett’s effective tax rate on these nine holdings was more than 32%.

Buffett Holdings from September 30, 2011 13F
Click to enlarge

This should debunk the myth that America’s investor class does not pay its “fair share” and that we should put a minimum of 30% on their 1040 filings.

Finally, some advice for Romney. Should you become the GOP candidate, I would advise that you do an analysis on your income similar to what I did for Buffett in the table above. If you are the GOP candidate, you can take the issue of paying your “fair share” of taxes off of the table.

November 9, 2011

Euro End Game: All Roads Lead to Monetary Breakup

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, Bonds, Capital, community banks, crises, derivatives, Finance, Forward thinking, government, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, local banks, municipal bonds, San Francisco, Stocks, taxes tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 6:39 PM by Robert Barone

— Three major issues must be resolved to save the European Monetary Union (EMU): The value of sovereign debt; the European bank capital issues; and the fiscal capacity or will to provide the needed financing. Unfortunately, no feasible solutions exist. The politicians have done everything they could to keep the market on the edge while, at the same time, continuing to kick the can down the road. The farther the can is kicked, the more painful and costly the ultimate resolution — the breakup of the EMU.

The Value of Sovereign Debt

As of this writing, the haircut on Greek sovereign debt currently on the table is 50%. The French want as small a discount as possible (it was originally set to 21% in the July agreement which was just ratified by the EMU countries a couple of weeks ago) because French banks hold volumes of Greek sovereign debt.

Germany, the other major player in the drama, wants a larger discount to force the private sector to contribute to the resolution, and because they know that they, and they alone, are the ultimate guarantor. The 50% haircut, however, is really not 50% because the EFSF and ECB, which hold 55% of all Greek debt, are exempt from the
haircut. So, at the max, Greece will be relieved of 22.5% of its debt.

However, in order to give Greece a half a chance to survive within the euro circle, the discount should be 80%, not 22.5%%. Even at an 80% discount, Greece’s Debt/GDP ratio will still be greater than 90%. At a 22.5% haircut, their Debt/GDP ratio will be so high, and interest payments to outside debt holders so onerous that it will require too much austerity. As we have just witnessed, Greece cannot meet the current required austerity measures imposed by outsiders. If the haircut on the Greek debt is too small and austerity is too severe, which it will be under the current set of principles being discussed, social unrest will continue. 

Ultimately, the Greek people will elect politicians who vow to remove the imposed austerity. The rise of Hitler was partly the result of imposed “reparations” from the previous war and the hyperinflation that resulted. If still inside the EMU, the problem of the value of the Greek sovereign debt re-emerges under the scenario now on the table. So, it is vital that the Greek debt haircut be large enough to give Greece at least a chance to succeed within the EMU. Of course, that assumes that there is a shift within Greece away from the entitlement mentality
that pervades the culture and that, given a second chance, they will adhere to a fiscal discipline. History indicates low odds of this.

But there are more issues that arise in the scenario in which Greece is given a second chance and kept inside the EMU. The slippery slope is that if the bond haircut is high, then Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy see that Greece has been given a second chance with much of its debt forgiven, they will want the same treatment. After
all, why should these countries institute austerity to pay the private sector and often foreign debt holders when Greece doesn’t have to.

In order to avoid the contagion that the others will want the same deal as Greece, there will have to be a consequence that dissuades them. The only consequence I can think of that is serious enough to dissuade them is expulsion from the EMU. Therefore, in order to avoid contagion under a scenario of an 80% bond haircut, it is
essential that Greece leave the monetary union, and that the EU set up and strictly enforce expulsion criteria.

Ultimately, though, because the four problem countries all have the same entitlement mentality, they will never be able to maintain the required fiscal discipline, and will ultimately be expelled. Apparently, the European politicians recognize this.  So, the 22.5% haircut deal currently on the table simply kicks the can further
down the road. The deal on the table cannot ultimately work.

European Bank Capital Issues

No matter how it is sliced or diced, Europe’s major banks are undercapitalized, and that is being kind. If
the sovereign debt they hold is marked to market, they are all insolvent. As we know from America’s S&L crisis in the ’80s and from the recent ’09 meltdown experience, a financial institution can operate in an insolvent condition for years, as long as it can get liquidity. In fact, there may still be such zombies in the U.S.

Enter the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). It’s function will be to support (i.e., buy) the underwater sovereign debt held on the books of Europe’s financial institutions at prices significantly above market, thus transferring the ultimate losses from the private sector to the taxpayer. The Fed did this in ’09, purchasing billions of mortgage-backed securities at above market prices from U.S. financial institutions. In effect, this is equivalent to the taxpayer making a capital contribution to the banks without receiving any ownership
interest. This is just a gift from taxpayers to stock and bond holders.

The ultimate capital contribution to the European banks will be in the trillion euro range, and it is likely that the EFSF will attempt to use leverage. But, because the capital contributions to the EFSF already being discussed (and I expect they aren’t as large as they need to be) are large relative to Europe’s GDP, there are likely to be ratings downgrades, causing interest costs to rise and making austerity in the EU even harder to bear. Under existing discussions, France, one of the two major characters in the whole crisis, is expected to make a contribution to the EFSF that is equal to 8% of its GDP. This alone will surely result in a ratings downgrade, as its Debt/GDP ratio has risen nearly 20 percentage points this year alone.

How long will the public endure the resulting austerity? Only long enough for the political process to elect leaders who promise to get rid of it. And, how do they do that? Exit the EMU.

Fiscal Capacity

It is clear that Germany and France are the key players (who are expected to be saviors) in this European drama. As explained above, as the drama unfolds, it is likely to put a tremendous strain on France’s fiscal capacity making it impossible for France to contribute further resources to the crisis (they are already on the hook for a significant contribution to resolve the Dexia issues). That leaves Germany as the last bastion of the euro. Think of the irony. The German people, by a large majority, never wanted to join the EMU. Their politicians brought them in kicking and screaming. Now, they are going to be asked to pay for all the entitlement and profligacy of their European neighbors. This just isn’t going to fly. When it gets to this point, and it will, Germany will simply say no, and that will be the end of the EMU.

Conclusion

It is already too late. The euro cannot be saved without the adoption of the U.S. federal model where the countries become the equivalent of U.S. states with one monetary and fiscal policy, ultimately run by Germany. Because of culture and history, the odds of this happening are about 0%.

The financial ministers can meet. There can be weekly, or even daily summits between the prime ministers. They can dream up debt Ponzi schemes with the EFSF, and can transfer losses from the private sector to the taxpayer. And, they are likely to do all of the above. But, ultimately, it is too late.

The EMU did not enforce its original rules, and now there is way too much debt. Like the S&Ls in the U.S. in the ’80s, it can be propped up for awhile. But, all of the actions that add debt or transfer it from the private sector to the taxpayer only make the final resolution more gut wrenching, difficult, and expensive. All roads lead to the breakup of the EMU. Better to do it now, in a controlled and orderly way, rather than let the happenstance of random events cause it to happen in the midst of a market crash.

Robert Barone, Ph.D.

Robert Barone and Joshua Barone are Principals and Investment Advisor Representatives of Universal Value Advisors, LLC, Reno, NV, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor.

Statistics and other information have been compiled from various sources. Universal Value  Advisors believes the facts and information to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee to the complete accuracy of this information.

Universal Value Advisors, LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States. A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its “Firm Brochure”, (Form ADV, Part 2A). A copy of this Brochure may be received by contacting the company at: 9222 Prototype Drive,  Reno, NV 89521, Phone (775) 284-7778.

October 18, 2011

Seven Reasons Bank Stocks May Keep Falling

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, Bonds, Capital, community banks, crises, derivatives, Finance, Forward thinking, government, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, local banks, municipal bonds, San Francisco, Stocks, taxes, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 10:22 PM by Robert Barone

  • Occupy Wall Street – while not a cohesive movement, at least part of its birth can be traced to outsized Wall Street salaries and bonuses, especially since the taxpayer saved most of the TBTF banks.  Bank Transfer Day (11/5), the day on which Americans are supposed to transfer their deposits to community banks, is more symbolic than real, as the “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) banks core consumer deposits are only a small portion of their liabilities and can easily be replaced with no or low cost funding from the Fed or elsewhere.  Nevertheless, Bank Transfer Day is a PR issue for the large banks;
  • Margin squeeze – TBTF have used the arbitrage spread between borrowing costs (near 0%) and Treasury yields (2%+) to profit.  And, the purchase of Treasury securities requires no capital under the capital regulations, as Treasuries are “risk free.”   The Fed’s new policy of “Operation Twist” targets  longer term interest rates and squeezes this arbitrage spread;
  • Volcker Rule – this has recently been put out for comment by the FDIC.  It severely limits trading profits made for the bank’s own account and is likely to have a big impact on TBTF trading profits going forward;
  • Debit card monthly fees – although such fees are a direct consequence of the limitation on debit swipe fees by the Fed under Dodd-Frank, and it was common knowledge that the TBTF banks would find a way to increase fees elsewhere to make up for their losses on the swipe fees, the timing has turned out to be lousy and the TBTF banks are taking a PR hit from the press, and even from the sponsors of Dodd-Frank who clearly knew that there would be unintended consequences;
  • Exposure to Europe – According to Michelle Bachmann, the U.S. TBTF Banks have a $700 billion exposure to European Banks.  So, a freezing up of liquidity flows to those institutions may have an impact on the value of such holdings.  It is clear that the Fed and the European Central Bank will intervene with massive liquidity injections if such events unfold.  Nevertheless, the risk of such a freeze up exists.  Furthermore, if contagion spreads because of a Greek default, there is no doubt that the TBTF equities will be negatively impacted.  So far, we have seen the equity prices of these behemoths ebb and flow with the news (or hope) out of Europe regarding their evolving “rescue” plan;
  • Mortgages & Foreclosures
    • Foreclosures at the TBTF institutions are rising because moratoriums have expired and “robo” issues have been addressed.  In addition, so called “Prime” loans in portfolios (usually “Jumbo” loans – those that are larger than the FNMA limits) are becoming a big issue as there is a clear trend toward rising “strategic” foreclosures.  In fact, Fitch recently downgraded many of these “prime” mortgage pools.  This calls into question the quality of what may be on the TBTF balance sheets in the form of such jumbo loans.  Furthermore, the fact that FNMA and FHLMC reduced their loan maximums on October 1st is destined to have a huge negative impact in states like CA and FL, where the prices of higher end properties will fall due to the unavailability of financing.  So, expect “strategic” defaults to rise rapidly in these states;
  • Lawsuits
    • Half of America’s mortgages are on MERS (Mortgage Electronic Registration System), but, in many states, MERS has no standing in foreclosure.  Theoretically every owner of a securitized pool should sign off on each foreclosure in the pool.  There could be hundreds, if not thousands, of owners in these pools.  In addition, many jurisdictions require that title transfers be recorded in county recorder offices.  Since that did not occur, lawsuits are now being developed against the major TBTF players for lost recording/title transfer fees.  The Dallas DA recently sued MERS and BAC for $100 million of such fees.  According to Mark Hanson, since MERS has been operating since 1995, there could be billions of dollars of such thwarted fees.   Because nearly every local governmental entity is hungry for funds, this could catch on like wildfire;
    • Bank of America’s (BAC) $8.6 billion global servicer settlement is in trouble, as NY’s AG Schneiderman says it should be closer to $25 billion, and he is getting support from other states, like CA.  The rumor mill has circulated the theory that if lawsuit settlements become outsized, BAC appears to have the option of bankrupting the old Countrywide unit, which it has kept as a separate legal entity since its purchase in 2008.  Imagine, though, the market reaction to such a move!
    • Lawsuits on mortgage trustees are just starting.  According to Bloomberg, US Bank, Bank of NY Mellon, Deutsche Bank, Wells Fargo, HSBC, BAC and Citibank (C) are the major mortgage trustees.  Bloomberg speculates that since these institutions didn’t underwrite, sell, securitize, service, or ship loans according to regulations, the odds are low that the trust departments got it right.  So far, NY’s Schnedierman has requested documents from Deutsche Bank and Bank of NY Mellon.
    • In early September the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the receiver for FNMA and FHLMC, sued BAC, C, JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Barclays, HSBC, Credit Suisse, and Noruma Holdings demanding refunds from these institutions for loans sold to FNMA and FHLMC that were based on false or missing information about the borrowers or the properties.  The FHFA said that the two mortgage giants purchased $6 billion from BAC, $24.8 billion from Merrill Lynch which is now owned by BAC, and $3.5 billion from C.
    • Lawsuits and foreclosure issues are making the TBTF banks sorry they are in the mortgage business.  JPM’s Dimon announced that they are going to be leaving the mortgage business, and BAC announced last week that by year’s end they will stop buying mortgages from correspondents.

Not all of this appears to be priced in the market, so there may be continued downward pressure on the prices of financial stocks, especially TBTF, as events unfold, especially the potentially disruptive forces that Europe may unleash, or the conclusion that the foreclosure and mortgage lawsuits are larger and more significant than currently believed.

Robert Barone, Ph.D.

October 12, 2011

Statistics and other information have been compiled from various sources.  Ancora West Advisors believes the facts and information to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee to the complete accuracy of this information.Ancora West Advisors LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States.  A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its “Firm Brochure”, (Form ADV, Part 2A).   A copy of the Brochure may be received by contacting the company at: 8630 Technology Way, Suite A, Reno, NV 89511, Phone (775) 284-7778

October 10, 2011

Buy and Hope

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, Bonds, Capital, community banks, crises, derivatives, Finance, Forward thinking, government, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, local banks, municipal bonds, San Francisco, Stocks, taxes, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 10:10 PM by Robert Barone

Despite a preponderance of evidence, the markets continue to rely on the “hope” that Europe will solve its enormous financial issues, that the U.S. will somehow miraculously begin to grow at or above GDP potential, and that the emerging markets will continue to grow by exporting to the developed world.  There are those on Wall Street still pushing “buy and hold” indicating to clients that, based on forward earnings forecasts, the equity markets look cheap, as if those forward forecasts aren’t subject to downward revisions.  Thus, the “buy and hold” is really “buy and hope.”  There are no quick fixes to any of the economic problems so evident in a world awash in debt.

Europe

  • Europe is clearly entering a recession, and is likely to be in it for an extended period.
  • The value of the sovereign debt of the European periphery countries is a huge issue.  Greece can afford to pay “normal” interest rates on about 20%-30% of its current debt.  Therefore, when its inevitable default occurs (looks like soon), the haircut on its external debt may be as high as 80%.  Once the default is announced, the markets will pounce on the next weakest – at this time, that looks like Italy, although Portugal and Spain are also in the race..  To keep Italy from defaulting, the Troika (the European Union (EU), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) may have to finance Italy’s deficit and purchase its debt rollover for as many as 3 years.  The rollover of central government debt alone is €705 billion. The regional debt is also significant. The risk is that Germany or one of the other 17 European Monetary Union (EMU) members balk.
  • The real issue revolves around the European financial system.  There isn’t enough capital in it to mark the sovereign debt they hold on their books to market values.  The haircuts given to the peripheral sovereign debt when a Greek default occurs will cause an ugly reaction in the financial markets.  Huge liquidity infusions from the ECB (and likely the Fed) will be required.  Morgan Stanley says that €140 billion in new capital is needed, but I have seen estimates as high as €800 billion.
  • Discussions among Europe’s finance ministers about using the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) as a Special Purpose Vehicle to provide liquidity or to provide capital to the banking system (the discussion seems to change on a daily basis) have caused the financial markets to rise on such hope.  As far as I can tell, the €780 billion of capital that is being voted upon by the 17 EMU members (14 have approved so far) could be used as capital to lever up to higher levels and use the resulting funding for either or  both liquidity and capital.
  • This is all still in discussion stage.  Somehow, Greece miraculously found funds to keep itself solvent until mid-November, so the European finance ministers have kicked the can down the road for another month.  The real risk here is whether or not the Europeans can agree.  History is not on their side.  Unlike the U.S., the EMU requires unanimous consent and monetary contributions from each of its 17 members to cope with unusual circumstances not envisioned in the EMU treaties.  Malta and Cyprus have the same veto power as Germany.  It should be noted that, as of this writing, the Slovakia vote on an expanded EFSF is not a sure thing, and that Finland received special guarantees for its approval vote.  Imagine the chaos if every small member demanded special treatment – it could look like the earmark system used in the U.S. Congress.
  • Italy was recently downgraded 3 notches by Moody’s, from Aa2 to A2 with a negative outlook.  The Credit Default Swap (CDS) market believes Italy is still significantly overrated, as is most of the rest of Europe.  CDS may not be the best indicator of financial stability, but it appears that there are enough skeptics on European sovereign debt to make investors wary.  If much of Europe eventually gets downgraded, what kind of rating will the EFSF’s debt have?
  • In its current form, the EFSF must wait for a support request from a member country, and then must get unanimous consent from the 17 finance ministers.  (I smell gamesmanship in the form of holdout for special concessions – just like Finalnd!)

As you can see, the machinery is quite cumbersome and very slow to act.  Things must go flawlessly for Europe to avoid significant calamity over the next few quarters.  The excitement recently seen in the equity markets appears to be based on hope – not a very reliable investment strategy.

Japan and the Emerging Markets

  • Japan has too much debt coupled with deteriorating demographic trends.  Since the 1990s, they have not addressed the issues on their banks’ balance sheets, and real estate prices (land) have continued to decline for those two “lost” decades.  Their August industrial production numbers were weaker than expected.  Don’t look for Japan to lead. Their two decaded economic malaise may, in fact, be what is in store for Europe and the U.S.
  • There are also troubling signs in China and the emerging markets (BRICS).  HSBC’s PMI index for China has been below 50 for three consecutive months (below 50 implies contraction).  Whatever the case, growth is clearly cooling, most likely indicating some success in China’s fight against rising inflation, especially in real estate where prices are now flat to falling.  This, of course, is having a significant impact on natural resource and commodity prices.
  • It is unlikely that China, which still has positive, but slower, growth, will repeat the stimulus package they unleashed in ’09.  That helped the rest of the world climb out of recession.  The rapidly falling prices of industrial commodities (e.g., copper) is symptomatic of the slower pace of growth in the emerging world.
  • Some emerging markets, like Brazil, which have been fighting the inflation caused by the influx of capital from the developed world, are now seeing declining growth rates, most likely due to the slowing growth in the developed world which has a huge impact on emerging world exports and prices.

United States Housing Market

  • Housing normally leads the U.S. economy into recession, and then leads it out.  Not so this time.  Housing issues are getting worse, not better.  Prices, especially those of higher end homes, continue to fall, even with mortgage rates at historic lows (below 4% for 30 year fixed).  Qualifying is now extremely difficult and requires a large down payment.  On October 1, FNMA and FHLMC lowered the maximum amounts they will lend.  Since they purchase over 90% of all new loans made, this will significantly lower sales volumes, and eventually prices, in high priced areas like California.
  • Foreclosure trends are on the rise, both because the financial institutions have worked their way through the “robo” signing issues, and because most foreclosure moratoriums have expired.  Given the sorry state of housing, more and more underwater homeowners are simply giving up on ever seeing positive equity again.  “Strategic” defaults are on the rise.  These occur when a homeowner who can afford the payments walks away because the mortgage balance is significantly higher than the home’s value, and the owner believes it will be years, if ever, before he breaks even.  As a result, Fitch has recently lowered the ratings on what used to be called “prime” mortgage loans causing some dislocations in mutual and hedge funds that specialize in holding such non-agency paper, especially the ones that also use leverage.
  • Lawsuits are proliferating around mortgage issues.  The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS), a private corporation with about 50 employees, claims to hold title to about half of the mortgages in the U.S.  They have filed foreclosure actions on behalf of the mortgage “owners” (there could be several hundred or even thousands of owners of a securitized pool).  Many jurisdictions require the “owner” to file the foreclosure.  Imagine having to get signatures of everyone that owns a share of a securitized mortgage pool each time one of the mortgages in the pool goes into default.  In addition, many jurisdictions require that title transfers be recorded in county recorder offices.  Since that did not occur, lawsuits are now being filed against major private sector mortgage purveyors (like JPM, or WF) for lost recording/title transfer fees.  The Dallas DA recently sued MERS and BAC for $100 million.  According to Mark Hanson, since MERS has been operating since 1995, there could be billions of dollars of such thwarted fees.
  • Mortgage trustees are also not immune from lawsuits.  According to Bloomberg, US Bank, Bank of NY Mellon, Deutsche Bank, Wells Fargo, HSBC, Bank of America, and Citibank are the major mortgage trustees.  Bloomberg speculates that since these institutions didn’t underwrite, sell, securitize, service, or ship loans according to regulations, the odds are low that the trust departments got it right.  So far, NY AG Schneiderman has requested documents from Deutsche bank and Bank of NY Mellon.
  • The $8.6 billion mortgage servicer settlement that Bank of America thought was a done deal has now fallen apart.  NY’s AG, Schneiderman thinks that the settlement should be closer to $25 billion.
  • With all of the lawsuits and the state of housing, the large mortgage originators are sorry they are even in the business.  Jamie Dimon recently announced that JPMorganChase may be leaving the business.  In early October, Bank of America announced they would stop their correspondent mortgage business by year’s end, which means that they won’t be buying mortgages originated by others.  One more nail in housing’s coffin.

So, let’s review: 1) Home prices continue to fall; 2) FNMA and FHLMC lowered their loan maximums; 3) Foreclosures are rising; 4) Lawsuits are proliferating on private sector lenders; 5) large private sector lenders are either leaving the business or curtailing it.  So, how is it that housing can lead the way out of the economic funk?

Other U.S. Indicators

  •  70% of GDP in the U.S. is from consumption.  The fact that real consumer income (after inflation) has fallen for three months in a row and is no higher than it was in 1997 is a very troubling sign because credit can no longer be used to consume.  In the months in which we actually see consumption rising, we see the savings rate fall.  Increasing consumption in an economy with falling consumer income can only last as long as there is savings.  So, it can only be a short-run phenomenon.
  • Washington, D.C. finds it impossible to come to terms with their overspending.  Nothing they have done, including the $1.5 trillion “Supercommittee” mandate will make a dent in the entitlement spending increases coming at us like a speeding train.  We know no changes in the entitlement rules will occur before 2013, at the earliest.
  • What is occurring at the Federal, State and Local levels is significant belt tightening.  President Obama’s Jobs Bill was DOA in Congress.  Because of the tax increases proposed, the Democrats even had a difficult time in finding a sponsor to introduce the bill.  With the funds provided in the ’09 stimulus package now gone, with a Congress not interested in more tax and spend, and with the Fed now out of real ammunition, there isn’t going to be much government help for a weakening economy.
  • Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, Obamacare, EPA pronouncements, other regulatory burdens, the uncertainty surrounding taxes and tax rates etc. has led to an environment of business uncertainty.  Under such conditions, there is virtually no chance that labor markets will pick up anytime soon.  As a result, consumer confidence continues to bounce along well below traditional recessionary levels.

 

Conclusion

The preponderance of the evidence makes it clear that the risks in the equity markets are to the downside.  There are no quick fixes to any of the European or U.S. problems.  Europe’s financial issues can easily morph into a worldwide financial panic.  The U.S.’s housing, deficit, and employment issues will linger without a new approach, one that we won’t see until at least 2013.  Safety is clearly a better investment strategy than hope.

Robert Barone, Ph.D.

October 10, 2011

Statistics and other information have been compiled from various sources.  Ancora West Advisors believes the facts and information to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee to the complete accuracy of this information.

Ancora West Advisors LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States.  A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its “Firm Brochure”, (Form ADV, Part 2A).   A copy of the Brochure may be received by contacting the company at: 8630 Technology Way, Suite A, Reno, NV 89511, Phone (775) 284-7778.

 

October 3, 2011

Kicking the Can: The Issue of Bank Capital

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, Bonds, Capital, community banks, crises, derivatives, Finance, Forward thinking, government, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, local banks, municipal bonds, San Francisco, Stocks, taxes, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 10:36 PM by Robert Barone

In the last quarter century, each and every time politicians have “kicked the can down the road” in order to buy time to protect their banks (with the false hope that there will be a “Deus ex Machina,” i.e., a miracle), the resulting pain is much worse than if the problem had been addressed head on and resolved, even if painful at the time.  You can look at this in many ways, including the deficit and entitlement issues in the U.S.  But, I am going to limit myself to the financial realm in this particular essay.

Kick the Can: The S&Ls

In 1984, I gave a presentation to a group of senior citizens regarding what I saw as the insolvency of the S&L industry.  In social conversations, my wife often recalls the reactions of many of those seniors, many of whom had Certificates of Deposit at S&Ls (back then, interest rates were significantly higher than today’s paltry rates).  I suspect that the local heart specialists were busier than usual the next day.

The S&L can was kicked down the road for five more years.  It wasn’t until a new President (Bush #1) was inaugurated that the problem was addressed – that was 1989.  By then, the problem was significantly larger than it was in 1984 when even I could recognize the issue.  Because the can was kicked for five years, America went through an unnecessary and grueling recession in the early ‘90s, in which the financial system teetered and required government intervention.  Truth be told, however, the allowance of the S&Ls to abuse deposit insurance (or at least not appropriately pay for the risk they were layering onto the insurance system) and lack of oversight by the regulators (sound familiar?) should take much of the blame.  However, by ’89 the crisis was addressed, S&Ls were closed, and the bad loans on their books were dealt with.  Because the bad loans were written off, the financial system stabilized and enabled the economy to grow and prosper for much of the rest of the decade.

Kick the Can: Japan’s Banks

At about the same time (1989) Japan’s bubble burst.  In 2002, then Fed Governor Bernanke, criticized the Japanese approach to their banking issues in a famous speech about how the Fed would not let a Japan style deflation happen in the U.S.  Beginning in 1989, the Japanese regulatory agencies did not, and to this day, have not required Japan’s banks to recognize the losses on their underwater real estate loans.  When banks get into a position of knowing they have problem assets, they become quite reluctant to expand their loan portfolios and take on new risk.  Oftentimes, the regulators, recognizing that they have dropped the ball in the first place, become overbearing and shackle the banking system.  More than two lost decades later, Japan’s real estate (land) prices are still falling, and economic growth remains sluggish, intermixed with frequent bouts of recession.

Kick the Can: Too Big To Fail

The financial crisis in the U.S. in ’09 was also met with can kicking.  The “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) banks that were allowed too much leverage in the period leading up to the crisis were all saved with taxpayer dollars. This time, however, the problems were not met head on as they were in ’89.  In fact, Dodd-Frank has now codified TBTF – those institutions are now called SIFIs, Systemically Important Financial Institutions.  And, America’s banks are back to playing the leverage game, this time with complicity from Washington, which depends on them to purchase newly issued debt.  By the way, that debt requires no underlying capital, an issue we will see later in this essay that has come to the forefront in Europe.  In the ’09 crisis, the shadow banking system (non-deposit taking lenders) was destroyed, and because the remaining small business lenders, America’s community banks, still have major asset issues, small business lending has dried up.  Today, as in Japan, economic growth is sluggish and the economy continuously flirts with recession. (I can’t blame all of the sluggishness in small business lending on the supply side because clearly the demand for small business loans is down due to the uncertain economic outlook that pervades America today.)

Kick the Can: Save the Bondholders

One major mistake of Japan, and of the so-called solution to the ’09 financial crisis, is that bondholders of most of these failing institutions, who took the risk of their investments, have not been asked to take the losses.  Except for FNMA and FHLMC, even the preferred shareholders of the failed megabanks (Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Merrill Lynch) were saved.  Why was it so important to save these stakeholders?  Did we really fall for the concept that if their bondholders lost money, then the economy would totally collapse?

Kick the Can: European Bank Stress Tests

Today, Europe’s banks are teetering on the edge.  This past Spring’s round of “stress tests” were a joke meant only to assuage the markets.  The sovereign foreign holdings of Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian debt were all counted at par with zero capital required against these assets.  It is clear that the European banks are in desperate need of capital, and the shutting down of calls for such capital from knowledgeable and respected individuals doesn’t really fool anyone.  So, why are the Europeans about to throw good money after bad in a futile attempt to keep Greece from defaulting, and, once again, kicking the can down the road?

By forcing further “austerity” on the Greek economy in order to give them enough aid to pay the upcoming round of bond maturities at par, and therefore “saving” those particular bondholders, they are just prolonging the whole issue.  Even more austerity will further undermine the Greek economy causing ever widening deficits.  So, why are the bondholders so sacred?  The answer, of course, is that the European banks hold huge positions in the sovereign debt of Greece and the other high debt European Monetary Union (EMU) nations.

Kick the Can: Liquefy European Banks

With huge volumes of such debt on their books, each financial institution has become leery of its brethren, and interbank lending has begun to dry up.  As a result, The Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Swiss national Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan, in a coordinated effort in mid-September, began making dollar swap lines available to the European banks.  It appears that the Fed is involved because of Bernanke’s view of the Fed as the world’s central bank, and because of the fact that the vast majority of America’s money market funds hold large amounts of European bank commercial paper or other debt as assets.  Thus, instability of the European banking system could potentially touch off another credit market freeze in the U.S. and worldwide.  Yet, despite these interventions, within a week those very same liquidity strains have begun to re-emerge.

Kick the Can: Greek Default Inevitable

In the end, a Greek default is inevitable.  The math on this is too compelling.  Even if Greece could balance their budget pre-debt service, the debt service cost alone, even at reasonable interest rates, doom them to years of depression.  For Greece, default is really the best road.

Default is also better for the rest of the EMU.  Better to use the funds that are now going to pay off bondholders of Greek debt at par to help recapitalize Europe’s banks.  In the long run, this is cheaper and it addresses the underlying issue, European bank capital.

As for Greece, they, and even the other weaker EMU countries, can go back to their own currencies, and, if they so choose, peg them to the Euro.  If they run large fiscal deficits, the pegs can always be adjusted.

Dealing with Greek Default

A Greek default, of course, risks a financial panic in the markets.  To deal with such contagion, the ECB or the EFSF (European Financial Stability Fund) or some pan-European or international entity with credibility, should specify which countries are Tier I EMU countries, which are Tier II (Italy and Spain),and which are Tier III (Greece, Portugal, Ireland).  Tier III countries should be planning an imminent, but orderly, exit from the EMU with ECB and EFSF support of their bonds at some price well below par.   Tier II countries should be given some time and support (in the form of an ECB or the EFSF bond purchase program at par) to get their fiscal houses in order.

The inevitable Greek default is going to have a worldwide impact even if done in an orderly, thoughtful, and coordinated way. (If not planned properly, expect very high volatility in the financial markets.)  And financial institutions in the U.S. will not be spared the effects of such a default.  If the European banks appear in danger, U.S. money market funds, and very likely some of the SIFIs with loans to European banks, will be hard hit by market action.  We have already seen the beginnings of this.

More Capital – the Reason for Basle III

It should be obvious by now that many of the largest worldwide banks need more capital.  Yes, even those in America.  (Consider the recent BAC denial of its need only to obtain capital within a week of the denial!)  The need for capital is why we have Basle III.  Unfortunately, the Basle III timeline is too lengthy, as the capital is needed now.  Without new capital, much of the developed world will suffer the fate that Japan has suffered over the past two decades and now present in the U.S., with banks too worried about capital levels to want to take on additional risk in the form of business loans.  Well-capitalized banks at least remove the constraint of loan availability when conditions are right for economic growth.

Robert Barone, Ph.D.

September 26, 2011

Statistics and other information have been compiled from various sources.  Ancora West Advisors believes the facts and information to be accurate and credible but makes no guarantee to the complete accuracy of this information.Ancora West Advisors LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States.  A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its “Firm Brochure”, (Form ADV, Part 2A).   A copy of the Brochure may be received by contacting the company at: 8630 Technology Way, Suite A, Reno, NV 89511, Phone (775) 284-7778.

 

September 14, 2011

Proper Policy and Economic Growth

Posted in Banking, Big Banks, Bonds, Capital, community banks, crises, derivatives, Finance, Forward thinking, government, investment advisor, investment banking, investments, local banks, municipal bonds, San Francisco, Stocks, taxes, Uncategorized tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , at 10:52 PM by Robert Barone

As indicated in a previous blog post entitled “Why the U.S. Can’t Grow Its Way Out Of Its Budget Jam”, http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/09/06/why-the-u-s-cant-grow-its-way-out-of-its-budget-jam/2/ , if GDP growth is as slow as PIMCO’s “new normal” would indicate, then even if the Congress could muster the ‘political courage’ to fix the budget and entitlement issues, lack of growth will trump that effort.  The first issue is that we have a government that doesn’t understand why the economy isn’t growing, and, in fact, promotes policies that inhibit such growth, such as overregulation, interference, and the promotion of more debt as the answer.  The second issue is the structural inability of the economy to grow.  The two issues are closely related.

Policy Gimmicks

Since the Great Recession began (and some believe that it still has not ended) policy makers have used various gimmicks to try to kick start the economic engine.  On the fiscal side, we have seen programs like cash for clunkers or first time homebuyer tax credits that simply have pulled demand forward rather than stimulating new demand.  On the monetary side, Bernanke and the Fed, deathly afraid of “deflation” (we can’t understand why falling prices are worse than rising prices – falling prices make incomes go further, rising prices do the opposite!) have managed, through their policies, to significantly raise the dollar prices of food, energy and related commodities.  Meanwhile, those policies have not halted the significant deflation in housing and its surrounding industries.  From a consumer point of view, the things that they own continue to fall in value, while the things that they need to purchase have risen in cost.  How are they better off after QE1, QE2, and most likely, QE3?

The Key To Growth

One critical issue centers around the level of debt of the American consumer, especially relative to income.  Most of America’s larger corporations have already lowered this ratio and have lots of cash to spend.  Thus, we have witnessed the relatively good performance of the share prices for most of these non-financial entities since 2009.  But the U.S. consumer, without job opportunities, is in a different class.  Demand cannot grow without a healthy consumer.  And, without rising demand, the economy simply stagnates. Some who say they have studied the Great Depression and some commentators today, believe that World War II was the primary factor that pulled America out of depression (see Paul Krugman, “Oh! What a Lovely War!”, New York Times, August 15, 2011).  But think about this: after World War II ended, why would there be an increase in demand?  What had changed? (Yes, there was demand from war torn Europe and Japan.  But I don’t think rational folks would advocate that we destroy assets, our own or those owned by foreigners, so that we can rebuild them.  Don’t forget, when an asset is destroyed, a loss to someone has occurred. If insured, the owners of the insurance company pay; if not, the owners of the property pay.)

Why the Great Depression Ended

The build-up of debt over the 16 years ended in 2008 is similar to the same phenomenon of that occurred in the 1920s.  During World War II, there was rationing and forced saving.  People of that generation often talked about the fact that they couldn’t buy a car, or tires, and that gasoline was rationed. Rationing forced the populace to save and pay down their debt, so that, by the end of the War, the consumers’ debt/income ratios were once again healthy and there was the capacity to increase consumption.  Of course, the rationing caused a huge build-up of pent-up demand.

Table 1 shows consumer debt outstanding for selected years prior to and in the aftermath of the Great Depression.  Table 2 shows a similar growth path in consumer debt and debt as a percentage of GDP from 1992 to 2008.

Table 1 – Consumer Debt, Its Growth Rate, and Its Relationship to GDP

The Great Depression

Year

Consumer Debt

(Billions $)

Periodic

CAGR

Consumer Debt/

GDP

1920

2.964

3.4%

1929

7.116

+10.2%

6.9%

1933

3.885

-14.0%

6.9%

1941

9.172

+11.3%

7.2%

1944

5.500

-15.7%

2.5%

Table 2 – Consumer Debt, Its Growth Rate, and Its Relationship to GDP

The Great Recession

Year

Consumer Debt

(Billions $)

Periodic

CAGR

Consumer Debt/

GDP

1992

799.8

12.6%

2008

2563.7

+7.6%

17.9%

2010

2411.6

-3.0%

16.6%

Note the rapid rise in consumer debt in the 1920s followed by rapid contraction during the initial years of the Great Depression.  Then, debt grew rapidly again until 1941, at which point it contracted rapidly during the war effort due to rationing and the unavailability of consumer goods.  Note that the ratio of consumer debt/GDP was lower in 1944 than it was in 1920.  What had changed during the War was a significant reduction in the indebtedness of the American consumer.

No such rapid consumer debt reductions are evident in the Great Recession, at least not through 2010.  There has been some reduction as shown in Table 2.  But, we believe this is due more to mortgage defaults than to actual consumer debt repayments.  Note the rapid declines in debt in both the 1929-33 and 1941-44 periods.  Reductions of that magnitude are not present in the current economic climate, and some government policies (cash for clunkers, and foreclosure moratoria) discourage debt reduction.  Given what was necessary in the debt area for the consumer to pull the U.S. out of the Great Depression, it appears that we have quite a long way to go in the current environment.

What Policy Can Accomplish

The key to economic growth is rising demand.  This doesn’t happen when existing roads are repaved or unemployment benefits are extended because demand falls back as soon as the road project is finished or the unemployment benefits run out. And, if the funds came from Washington, all we’ve done is raise the level of debt for the sake of current consumption.  If fiscal policy is to be used to stimulate demand, there are several directions it should take.  Today, America suffers from high and rising real costs of energy at a time when real incomes have been stagnant and debt to income ratios have strangled consumption growth.  A fiscal policy that promotes the development of cheap energy now would 1) create jobs, 2) put cash back to America’s consumers via lower gasoline and energy bills, 3) improve America’s balance of trade, and 4) provide less cash to middle-east oil nations and impede their ability to finance terrorism.  We do believe in alternative energy sources when they make sense.  But, the U.S. has an abundance of oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear technology know how.  Those are the areas that will immediately help the real economy, and, perhaps, reduce the need to send our young people to fight on foreign soil.  Ask yourself why the unemployment rate in North Dakota is 3.3%.  The answer: oil and agriculture.  From 1976 to 2010, Canada’s unemployment rate averaged 8.5%.  In July, it stood at 7.2%.  The reason: Canada has become a major exporter of oil (to the U.S.!) and natural resources.  Consumer confidence there is much higher than similar measures in the U.S.  And its deficit/GDP is half.

Policy Interference

The second way fiscal policy can positively impact U.S. economic growth is to reduce government interference in business.  This isn’t only a federal issue, as state and local governments do their part to harass small business.  But, let’s face facts: the banking system is nearly nationalized with “Too Big To Fail” (now codified in Dodd-Frank as SIFIs -Systemically Important Financial Institutions) allowing the giants to take excessive risk while government regulators strangle the entrepreneurial spirit of most community banks.  For sure, the government is the only real player in the mortgage market through the bankrupt FNMA and FHLMC entities which control 90% of the market (while losing billions of dollars every month).  Additional regulation via Dodd-Frank and the encouragement of and participation in lawsuits against those private companies still in the mortgage business has already, or will soon, reduce private sector participation in mortgages just when the economy needs a recovering housing sector.

Housing Leads

Housing has always led the economy into recession.  But, it has always led it out.  Not this time.  The mortgage pendulum has swung from one extreme (breathing qualified one for a 125% LTV mortgage) to the other (huge down payments, high income/payment ratios, and a near universal requirement to qualify for sale to FNMA or FHLMC, which, as of October 1 will have lower maximum loan acceptance levels).  The promotion of a universal mortgage refinance idea being bandied around Washington may stimulate some demand as consumers who get lower rates and payments may have more monthly disposable income, but what has been forgotten, or conveniently not discussed, is the loss of that cash flow to the investors who own the mortgage instruments.  In other words, this is just an income redistribution scheme which may not produce many jobs because the owners of the now lower yielding mortgage paper are more than likely the job creating entrepreneurs.  The real issue here is the continued downward spiral of home prices.  The policies followed in Washington have simply prolonged the pain.

Tax Code Gibberish

The personal income of one of the authors is derived from wages and consulting income.  Yet, his tax return is more than an inch thick, costs $1,500 to produce, and is a maze of incomprehensible gibberish.  This is symptomatic of the unnecessary and burdensome set of rules that the federal government has imposed on its citizenry.  Because Dodd-Frank and the Obamacare legislation have yet to be fully implemented, we can expect higher costs and more job killing rules and regulations.

The Private Sector Creates jobs

The real creation of jobs occurs in the private sector, by the private sector, not in government or by government.  Policy can encourage or discourage such job creation.  More than any other era in our lifetimes, government policy has discouraged private sector job creation.  Today, like in the 1930s, consumers need to reduce their debt burdens.  Policy cannot do this directly.  The gimmicks used thus far have pulled demand forward, have taken from one set of citizens and given to another, have increased the debt which will reduce future consumption, or have inflated food and energy prices via money creation.

However, proper policies can encourage economic growth.  Unfortunately, there is no “instant” cure.  Equally unfortunate, a Presidential election is but 14 months away, and that “instant” cure is what is being sought.  What America needs are policies that encourage and promote cheap energy, reduce government regulation, a complete reformation of the tax code, and the encouragement of debt reduction all while addressing spending and entitlements.  The track record in Washington to accomplish this is nil.  It’s no wonder that the price of gold continues its ever upward path.

Robert Barone, Ph.D.

Matt Marcewicz

September 12, 2011

Ancora West Advisors LLC is a registered investment adviser with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the United States.  A more detailed description of the company, its management and practices are contained in its registration document, Form ADV, Part II.  A copy of this form may be received by contacting the company at: 8630 Technology Way, Suite A, Reno, NV 89511, Phone (775) 284-7778

 

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